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The proliferation of low-cost competitors has increasingly eroded incumbent firms’ market 
shares and profitability in recent decades. However, incumbents are still uncertain about 
how to handle this new challenge. The two essays in this dissertation aim to contribute to 
the marketing strategy and competitive dynamics literature by exploring the link between 
incumbents’ marketing-mix activities and low-cost rival’s market entry, exit, and the threat 
of entry decisions.  
In the first essay, I study a common and important phenomenon – the marketing 
tactics that incumbent firms employ to drive new low-cost entrants out of the market. 
Specifically, I investigate how incumbents’ price, service quality, and service convenience 
influence an entrant’s market exit, and how this influence may change over time. The 
hypotheses are tested on a rich, longitudinal dataset from the US airline industry between 
1997 and 2016. I estimate challengers’ time-to-exit using a split population hazard model 
that accounts for challengers that ‘never’ exit. Instead of homogeneous results, I find that 
the magnitude and direction of the effects vary over time. For instance, a substantial price-
cut initially delays but will later accelerate an entrant’s exit timing. I suggest that managers 
should take into account the type (price vs. quality), timing (sooner vs. later after entry), 
and intensity (more vs. less) of defensive responses to a new low-cost entrant.  
vi 
 
When a firm makes an action that takes it closer to a market, incumbent firms would 
profit from knowing whether such threat is to be taken seriously – and one that incumbents 
could do something about – or a bluff – that incumbents could ignore. Thus, in the second 
essay, I estimate the probability of a serious (vs. a bluff) threat as a function of market 
characteristics as well as the characteristics of the potential entrant and those of incumbents 
and the structure of their market network. In line with the awareness-motivation-capability 
framework, I argue that a threat is more (less) likely to be serious (bluff) when the potential 
entrant has the motivation to enter the market as well as the capability of doing so. This 
study provides insights for managers of incumbent firms on how to more effectively and 
efficiently allocate limited marketing resources over time to defend ‘their’ markets – or do 
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ESSAY 1: REPELLING INVADERS:  
USING MARKETING TACTICS TO THWART LOW-COST 
ENTRANTS1 
 
“We’ve finally reached the point, perhaps, where [low cost carrier] penetration may be fatal.” – David 
Grizzle, Senior Vice President, Continental Airlines.2 
 
Incumbent firms across many industries face the challenge of an increasing threat: the entry 
of rivals into ‘their’ markets. These market entries disrupt incumbents, damages their 
margins, and may dramatically change the rules of the game (Luoma, et al. 2018; Spann, 
Fischer, and Tellis 2014). While incumbent firms can take some comfort in academia and 
industry reports indicating a high chance of exit after an entry (Horn, Lovallo, and Viguerie 
2005; Luoma, et al. 2018; Robinson and Min 2002), they cannot simply ‘wait and see’, as 
allowing a new entrant to survive and eventually thrive can have devastating effects. 
Instead, they take an active role towards firms entering ‘their’ markets, especially when 
new entrants are ‘low-costs.’3  
Past research on the antecedents of the market entry failure has devoted a lot of 
attention to the market- and new-entrant’s characteristics such as overall expected demand, 
industry concentration (Dunne et al. 2013; Van Kranenburg, Palm, and Pfann 2002), firm 
age and size, entry timing, pre-entry experience and knowledge, multi-market contact, and
                                                 
1 Aghaie, Sina., Carlos Lourenço, and Charles Noble. To be submitted to Marketing Science 
2 Source: “Low cost airlines put the crunch on biggest carriers,” The Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2002. 
3 One of many similar examples involves EasyJet, one of Europe’s biggest and most successful low-cost 
airlines. In early 2017 EasyJet announced it would stop flying the Lisbon-Ponta Delgada route in Portugal, 
two years after having moved in. According to its managers, despite the growing demand in that market, the 
low-cost airline left because it could not guarantee its service standards, namely in terms of flight frequency, 
though customers argue the truth is it could no longer cope with low prices practiced by incumbents. In other 




both mode and order of entry, and strategic fit (Boeker et al. 1997; Gatignon, Robertson, 
and Fein 1997; Homburg et al. 2013; Johnson and Tellis 2008; Papyrina 2007; Sinha and 
Noble 2008; Sousa and Tan 2015). Surprisingly, most studies either ignored the link 
between incumbents’ marketing tactics and new entrants’ time-to-exit or implicitly 
assumed that rival’s characteristics and activities (i.e., incumbent firms in the market) have 
no impact on the new entrant’s survival. Moreover, except for a few studies (Geroski, Mata, 
and Portugal 2010 and Nikolaeva 2007), prior literature usually explored the time-invariant 
effects of market exit drivers and remained mostly silent about how those effects may 
change over time. 
In this paper, we take a step at addressing these gaps by investigating how 
incumbents’ price- and non-price marketing arsenals influence the new entrant’s market 
exit, and how these influences may evolve over time. More specifically, we link the time-
to-exit of a new low-cost market entrant to incumbents’ price, service convenience, and 
service quality. Drawing on the related notions of action irreversibility (Chen and 
MacMillan 1992; Chen et al. 2002) and information economics (Connelly et al. 2011; 
Panagopoulos et al. 2018; Prabhu and Stewart 2001; Talay, Akdeniz, and Kirca 2017), we 
predict that the ability of incumbents’ price-cuts to repel a low-cost newcomer4 actually 
grows over time. On the other hand, we expect that an incumbent’s better service 
convenience and higher service quality accelerates a newcomer’s exit time regardless of 
the newcomer’s time in the market.  
We focus on the entries by the low-cost firms in markets previously dominated by 
premium (vs. low-cost) incumbent firms. Low-cost entrants proliferate at a higher rate 
                                                 
4 Note that we use “newcomer”, “new entrant”, and “challenger” interchangeably. 
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today than they did a decade ago (Ryans 2009), and in a range of industries, from grocery 
retailing (e.g., Wal-Mart and, more recently, Aldi supermarkets in the US) to the airline 
industry (e.g., Southwest in the US or EasyJet in Europe), to consumer technology (e.g., 
Huawei’s rapid global expansion in the less expensive smart phone market). We test our 
hypotheses empirically on an extensive, multi-market longitudinal dataset from the US 
airline industry. The volatile demand and a very competitive nature of the airline industry 
make it an attractive context for this research. In this industry, airlines compete with each 
other through price-cutting, service convenience (e.g., flight frequency) and service quality 
differentiation (Ethiraj and Zhou 2019). Additionally, budget airlines expansion has been 
frequently cited as one of the primary causes of premium airlines’ financial crisis (Ito and 
Lee 2003) 5, so, no wonder those in the airline industry, might see “a low-fare carrier 
coming into their turf like getting cancer” and, sooner or later, they “want to cut it out.”6  
Our results suggest that price-cuts although are the easiest and fastest way of 
responding to a new low-cost entrant, but at the same time, may not be the most efficient 
tools to quickly drive a new entrant out of the market and service-based strategies may be 
better suited for that task. For managers of incumbent firms, our findings may help to 
implement effective marketing tactics over time to repel new (low-cost) entrants. We 
contribute to prior literature on the antecedents of firm survival (Homburg et al. 2013; 
Johnson and Tellis 2008; Lieberman, Lee, and Folta 2017; Robinson and Min 2002; Wang, 
Chen, and Xie 2010) by introducing a broader set of marketing factors that impact a new 
entrant’s survival. Namely, we investigate price, service convenience, and service quality 
                                                 
5 See also Informational Brief of United Airlines, Inc., In the United States Bankruptcy Court For the Northern 
District of Illinois, December 9, 2002. 
6 See https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1031516620409380155 
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side-by-side, instead of focusing on just price (e.g., Dixit and Chintagunta 2007). Also, in 
contrast to previous research in marketing that has studied low-cost entrants’ time-to-exit 
in a static environment, we look at potential changes of marketing effects over time, which 
may shed light on mixed findings in the literature regarding the effect of incumbents’ prices 
on market exit (Dixit and Chintagunta 2007; Gatignon, Robertson, and Fein 1997).  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we establish the theoretical background on 
market exit drivers in the context of a new low-cost entrant. Second, we develop the 
conceptual framework and predictions relating incumbents’ marketing tactics, namely 
those related to price, service convenience, and service quality to the newcomer’s time-to-
exit. Third, we discuss the empirical modeling and estimation strategies and describe the 
airline industry data and the operationalization of the different variables used. Finally, we 
present the results of the study and consider implications for advancing marketing practice 
and future research. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Incumbent firms have relatively few general weapons with which to fend off invaders, 
particularly those that may operate more efficiently or be more deep-pocketed to weather 
a pricing war.  Customer loyalty, traditionally the most powerful sustainable advantage of 
incumbents, is declining as customers become more transactional and even seek new 
brands (Dawes et al. 2015; Lamey 2014; Umashankar et al. 2017; Wieseke et al. 2014)7. 
Beyond the strategically uninspired approach of price warfare, we believe certain service 
tactics may be key to repelling new, low-cost entrants, and explore such approaches here 





(Lusch, Vargo, and O’brien 2007; Obeng et al. 2016). We first consider the history of 
research exploring the antecedent of market exit in Table (1.1). This overview highlights 
the novel contributions of this study in considering various price and service-based tactics 
with time-variant effects considered.  
As we consider the potential strategic benefits of pricing and service tactics in the 
face of new entrants, we view incumbent actions as market information signals that can 
create (or alleviate) uncertainty for the new entrant and influence its competitive behaviors. 
Thus, the information economics perspective guides this research, particularly the 
underlying principles of: (1) information asymmetry, and (2) signaling effects.  
Information asymmetry. In the business world, exchange parties often have 
information differentials, otherwise known as an asymmetry (Panagopoulos et al. 2018). 
In our context, information asymmetry occurs when an incumbent has more and/or better 
information relative to a challenger about a market. We expect that a challenger’s 
information disadvantage triggers uncertainty regarding the future outlook of the market. 
As a result, the challenger firm constantly seeks information to reduce its uncertainty. Prior 
studies have indicated that competitors are one of the main sources of information and their 
activities contain embedded signals. However, the newcomer must process and evaluate 
these signals in order to resolve its uncertainty (Hsieh, Tsai, and Chen 2015; Luoma, et al. 
2018; Prabhu and Stewart 2001).  
Signaling. A market signal can be “any action by a competitor that provides a direct 
or indirect indication of its intentions, motives, goals, or internal situation” (Porter 1980, 
p.75). Traditionally, signaling theory has focused on two parties – the sender and receiver 
of the signal. Senders are seen as the entity of interest and possess unique information (i.e., 
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are the more informed party), while receivers stand to benefit from the sender’s signal and 
seek the information behind it (Vasudeva, Nachum, and Say 2018). The focus of research 
applying this theory has been on how sender attributes and intentions are inferred by the 
receiver in the absence of unequivocal information (Connelly et al. 2011). Fundamentally, 
signaling theory attempts to explain how information-disadvantaged firms use “credible” 
signals to reduce information asymmetry and competitive disadvantage (Steigenberger and 
Wilhelm 2018; Talay, Akdeniz, and Kirca 2017). A credible signal requires an apparent 
commitment to that course of action and action “irreversibility” level reflects the sender’s 
commitment to that competitive action. Thus, the notion of action irreversibility is central 
in establishing credibility (Wang and Xie 2011).  
Action irreversibility. Action is irreversible to the degree that, once undertaken, it 
is hard to change it in the future (Steen 2016). Perceived irreversibility can signal a 
commitment to an impending action and the unlikelihood it will be revoked. Prior studies 
have found that the degree of perceived irreversibility of competitive actions will shape 
rival behaviors (Chen and MacMillan 1992; Chen et al. 2002). According to Michael 
Porter: “Perhaps the single most important concept in planning and executing offensive 
and defensive competitive actions is the concept of commitment ... The persuasiveness of 
a commitment is related to the degree to which it appears binding and irreversible” (1980: 
100-101). The irreversibility of the incumbent’s action can significantly impact the 
challenger’s response behavior because it acts as a strong signal of the tenacity of a 
defender (Chen and MacMillan 1992).  
Irreversibility continuum. Prior studies have considered the irreversibility level as 
a spectrum, ranging from highly reversible to the highly irreversible. Highly reversible 
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actions can be reversed costlessly at any time (Chen et al. 2002). On the other end of this 
continuum are those actions that are highly irreversible because once the firm launches the 
action, it cannot get back to where it was before (Ghemawat 2016). Usually, marketing 
activities fall within this continuum where some actions are more readily reversible (e.g., 
price changes), some have a moderate level of irreversibility (e.g., promotions) and others, 
typically involving large investments, are more irreversible (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, 
development of new products). Given the binding nature of the irreversible actions, the 
vast majority of competitive responses in practice are more reversible in nature (Chen et 
al. 2002) so that the incumbent can maintain some strategic flexibility (Trigeorgis and 
Reuer 2017; Steenkamp et al. 2005). Built directly from the aforementioned tenets, the 
conceptual framework is predicated on an evolutionary view of a firm’s time-to-exit as a 
function of not only its own actions and characteristics but also, and decisively, those of 
incumbent competitors (Homburg et al. 2013; Reibstein and Wittink 2005), namely related 
to price, service convenience and service quality. We draw on these insights to predict how 
incumbents’ marketing activities affect the new entrant’s time-to-exit. 
Incumbents’ Marketing Tactics in the Face of New Entrants 
Incumbents usually adjust their marketing-mixes when faced with competitors entering 
their markets (Hauser and Shugan 2008; Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson 1999; Prince 
and Simon 2014; Shankar 1997; Simon 2005). Along with pricing tactics (Goolsbee and 
Syverson 2008; Luoma, et al. 2018), incumbent firms may use their services as strategic 
weapons to protect themselves from a new entrant. For instance, Obeng et al. (2016) found 
that incumbents with better services are more likely to withstand new competitive threats 
than those with fewer services. Thus, in this research, we focus on incumbents’ pricing and 
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service strategies as two main marketing tactics that incumbents will use in response to the 
new entrants.  
Incumbents’ price and the challenger’s exit timing. Perhaps the most common 
retaliatory action by an incumbent faced with a low-cost entrant is a price reduction 
(Goolsbee and Syverson 2008; Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996; Simon 2005). One 
motivation for this action, which might not be toward profit-maximizing in the short run, 
is to increase sales volume and inhibit the challenger from gaining a minimum efficient 
scale – increasing the challenger’s cost of production and cutting profit margins 
(Steenkamp et al. 2005). By reducing prices, incumbents send a clear signal to the 
challenger: that they have low enough production costs which enable them to compete 
aggressively on prices. This scenario anticipates that market becomes less attractive for the 
newcomers since they will achieve lower sales because of the incumbent’s aggressive price 
cuts (Hendricks and McAfee 2006). 
Dropping prices may also signal something more subtle, yet even more powerful to 
the challenger: that a particular market is worth defending. Since the newly-arrived 
challenger has asymmetric (i.e., less) information about the market, in particular about its 
future value, this signal is particularly informative to adjust expectations about market 
profitability and opportunities in the long run (Hsieh, Tsai, and Chen 2015; Porter 1985). 
From the challenger’s standpoint, rational incumbents defend the market by sacrificing 
short-term profits in hopes of recouping that loss in the long run (Guiltinan and Gundlach 
1996; Porter 1980). In sum, the challenger encountering lower incumbents’ prices faces 
mixed signals with respect to market attractiveness. On the one hand, incumbents’ price 
cuts might indicate their competitive advantage due to the low production cost, thus, signal 
9 
 
the new entrant that the market won’t be as attractive as it had expected before the entry; 
On the other hand, the challenger might interpret incumbents’ price-cuts as signals that 
there is a strong market opportunity that incumbents consider worth protecting, thus the 
market could be really attractive. 
We argue that the new entrant is more likely to view the incumbent’s price-cut as a 
bluff (Prabhu and Stewart 2001; Sunny Yang and Liu 2015) because it suspects the 
incumbent ability to sustain the profit loss for a long term. Since the price cut is an easily 
reversible action, the new entrant expects the incumbent to revert the price soon (Hambrick, 
Cho, and Chen 1996). Thus, we expect that the challenger is more likely to evaluate 
incumbents’ price cuts as the ‘market opportunity’ signal, thereby, will postpone its exit 
hoping to gather more accurate information about true market profitability and the 
incumbent’s intention in the future (Hitsch 2006).  
However, if the incumbents’ lower prices persist over a much longer horizon, we 
predict that the low production cost signal (i.e., low demand for the newcomer’s services) 
will be stronger and more credible. In this scenario, the challenger’s uncertainty about the 
incumbent’s ability to sustain low prices and its intention to do so diminishes, and it 
becomes increasingly clear that the incumbents are not bluffing and are instead committed 
to fiercely defending their market for a long time, making market less attractive (Chen, 
Kuo-Hsien, and Tsai 2007; Prabhu and Stewart 2001). Thus, the challenger will have little 
doubt it is time to leave and prevent further losses. Given all the above, we hypothesize 
that:  
H1: The effect of incumbents’ post-entry price cuts on the challenger’s time-to-exit 
is at first positive and becomes negative later on.  
10 
 
Incumbents’ service tactics 
Besides price-cut, an incumbent can also invest in two well established dimensions of its 
service strategies, namely service convenience and service quality (Andreassen, van Oest, 
and Lervik-Olsen 2018; Colwell et al. 2008; Farquhar and Rowley 2009; García-Fernández 
et al. 2018; Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 1988; Seiders et al. 2007; Thuy 2011). The 
perceived value of service is a result of what the consumer sacrifices (negative dimension) 
and gains (positive dimension) in return. The positive dimension indicates some benefit 
that consumer receives from service, such as quality (Parasuraman and Grewal 2000; 
Zeithaml 1988). The negative dimension, which reflects non-monetary expenses that 
consumer incurs such as time and effort to consume the service, referred to as service 
convenience. High service convenience reduces non-monetary costs such as the time and 
effort to receive and consume the service (Collier and Kimes 2013; Colwell et al. 2008; 
Farquhar and Rowley 2009; Zeithaml et al. 2006). 
Incumbents’ service convenience and the challenger’s exit timing. As mentioned 
earlier, service convenience is a consumer’s perception of time and effort spent buying or 
using a service (Berry, Seiders, and Grewal 2002). High convenience improves customer 
satisfaction, increases switching costs and enhances purchase and repurchase likelihood 
(Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml 2004; Seiders et al. 2007; Voss, Godfrey, and Seiders 2010). 
Prior literature has shown that service convenience can be improved in more ways than 
one (see Berry, Seiders, and Grewal 2002 and Seiders et al. 2007 for a review of 
convenience types). For example, firms can offer better access to their services by making 
them available longer and in new and more convenient locations, more days with longer 
operating hours (Collier and Sherrell 2010). This access convenience is particularly salient 
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in the case of non-separable services where customers must be present at the time of service 
delivery and consumption. Improving service convenience is a less reversible action in the 
short run because it can require a substantial investment and other commitments. For 
example, improving access convenience by opening more stores in easily accessible areas 
could cost millions of dollars. Thus, a challenger faced with incumbents’ service 
convenience improvements is more likely to interpret them as a credible signal of the 
incumbents’ commitment to defend a market and believes that the incumbent will “stick to 
it action” i.e., service convenience improvement. More formally, we propose that:  
H2: The effect of incumbents’ post-entry service convenience improvements on the 
challenger’s time-to-exit is negative. 
Incumbents’ service quality and the challenger’s exit timing. Service quality 
which is defined as a gap between customers perceived and expected service (Sivakumar, 
Li, and Dong 2014) may also act as a deterrent and influence new entrants (Hauser and 
Shugan 2008), regardless of whether incumbents intentionally adjust their service quality 
in response to a new low-cost entrant (Bendinelli, Bettini and Oliveira 2016; Prince and 
Simon 2014). From the new entrant’s perspective, the existing level of service quality 
among incumbents is an informative signal that can influence its time-to-exit. This is 
because, in general, incumbents’ high-quality services hurt new entrants, particularly low-
cost ones: high quality improves the demand for incumbents’ offerings, increases customer 
satisfaction and willingness to pay (Cho 2014), and generates referrals (Falk, 
Hammerschmidt, and Schepers 2010; Homburg, Koschate, and Hoyer 2005; Pauwels and 
D’Aveni 2016). Furthermore, incumbents’ high-quality services rely on managerial know-
how and capabilities that are hard to imitate (Parasuraman and Grewal 2000) and are 
typically a source of sustained competitive advantages (Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, and Fahy 
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1993; Srivastava, Fahey, and Christensen 2001). Moreover, since incumbents’ prior 
investments in quality are not easily reversible actions, the challenger sees them as credible 
signals of a strong commitment to protect the market (Chen, Smith, and Grimm 1992; 
Hambrick, Cho, and Chen 1996), thereby reducing the challenger’s uncertainty about the 
market outlook in the near and far future. 
Accordingly, we expect that the higher the levels of service quality of incumbents 
the less the new low-cost entrants can reap the expected benefits from the market – and are 
more likely to exit sooner than later. More formally, we hypothesize: 
H3: The effect of incumbents’ post-entry service quality on the challenger’s time-
to-exit is negative. 
Our conceptual framework, summarized in Figure 1.1, rests upon two key 
assumptions: (1) the new low-cost entrant has expectations but is uncertain about 
incumbents’ ex-poste marketing actions (Chen et al. 2002; Montgomery et al. 2005) and 
thus uncertain about the market outlook in the post-entry period (Claussen, Essling, and 
Peukert 2018; Ethiraj and Zhou 2019) and (2) the incumbents’ activities may, intentionally 
or unintentionally, work as informative signals by which the challenger reduces its ex-poste 
uncertainty about the market outlook (Luoma et al. 2018; Marcel, Barr, and Duhaime 2011; 
Zajac and Bazerman 1991). Although before entering any market, new entrant would 
definitely have studied the market to the best possible extent, have assessed market 
attractiveness and may expect to confront with the incumbent’s potential responses in terms 
of changes in pricing and service strategies, there is still considerable uncertainty with 
regards to the incumbent’s post entry activities (Luoma et al. 2018). Prior literature also 
corroborates this argument. For example, conducting an experimental study, Montgomery 
et al. (2005) found that due to the uncertainty and ambiguity associated with incumbents’ 
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future behaviors, managers usually do not (cannot) consider incumbents’ reactions when 
making market entry decisions 8. In line with our essentially exploratory positioning, we 
estimate the reduced-form relationships between marketing tactics and an entrant’s time to 
exit. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data Sources and Industry Context. This Airline industry is particularly well suited for 
our purposes because each one of the thousands of routes between any two airports is 
considered a unique market, where entries and exits are frequent and easily observed, and 
the identification of new entrants and existing incumbents is well established (Dixit and 
Chintagunta 2007; Ethiraj and Zhou 2019; Prince and Simon 2014). We focus on market 
entry and exit by low-cost carriers (LCC)9, which are frequent in this industry (Ethiraj and 
Zhou 2019; Prince and Simon 2014).  
Our data cover market-level information, carriers’ characteristics, and marketing 
activities over time, from the first quarter of 1997 through the fourth quarter of 2016. We 
limited our dataset to 11 major airlines that have the most complete data and remained 
significant players in the U.S. airline industry throughout that period: five low-cost carriers 
                                                 
8 Our dataset also verifies this assumption as almost 50% of market exit incidences occurred within 1 year 
after the entry. This indicates that the new entrants cannot fully assess the market condition before the entry 
and are faced with a large uncertainty about market attractiveness when making any entry decision. 
Moreover, on average incumbents reacted to the entry by cutting their prices by 5%. However, these reactions 
are distributed with high variability ranging from 80% price cut to 92% price rise. This also validates 
Montgomery et al. (2005) argument that precise prediction of the incumbents’ post entry reactions is not 
viable.  
9 Market entry (exit) is an important strategic decision which requires a strong motivation. For the low-cost 
carriers, the main factor that encourages them to enter (exit) a new market is the market profitability. 
Whereas, for the major airlines there are several factors in play. For example, a route profitability is not the 
only factor that affects entry (exit) decision, its contribution to the entire network profitability also matters 
and this factor will affect their decision of entry and exit. Moreover, major airlines might have motives other 
than profitability when entering a new market (i.e., they want to establish a foothold in the competitor’s’ 
main turf in order to prevent any further moves by that competitor in their own turf). So, to avoid any 
confounding effects, in this research, we are focusing on the low-cost entrants 
14 
 
including AirTran, Southwest, JetBlue, Frontier, and Spirit and 6 major airlines including 
Delta, American United, Continental, Northwest and, US Airways). Our sample represents 
an expansion on the previous studies that just explore Southwest entries (Dixit and 
Chintagunta 2007; Ethiraj and Zhou 2019; Prince and Simon 2014). In each route, we work 
with only quarterly observations in which a carrier transports at least 500 passengers 
between the origin and destination airports (see Dunn 2008 for similar criteria). This 
restriction ensures we are dealing with LCCs that have invested a minimum level of 
resources to gain market share after entry. Also, to avoid dealing with differences between 
major vs. low-cost incumbents, we only use routes where no other LCC incumbents operate 
at the time of entry, nor afterward.10  
Our dependent variable, time-to-exit, is the time elapsed between a challenger’s 
market entry and exit dates and is measured in quarters. Following Dixit and Chintagunta 
(2007), we consider that the LCC has exited a market if it has not served the market for 
two consecutive quarters. In our empirical analysis, we use 13,057 observations, 
comprising eighty quarters and 1,192 market entries by any of the five low-cost carriers, 
555 of which ended up in an exit at some point. The empirical distribution of market exits 
over time is depicted in Figure 1.2. Market entries that do not end up in an exit by the fourth 
quarter of 2016 are considered right-censored observations, which are also dealt with in 
the hazard model of time-to-exit. 
A Split-Population Hazard Model. we start by noting that some challengers will 
probably ‘never’ leave a market they have entered, which in a hazard or survival models 
                                                 
10 When analyzing firms’ decisions to stay in or leave a market, sunk costs, which are typically unavailable 
to researchers, may be a confound (Dixit 1989; Elfenbein and Knott 2015; O’Brien and Folta 2009), and one 




are often referred to as ‘cured subjects’ or ‘long-term survivors’ (Klein et al. 2016). In this 
situation, where there is a mixture of two subsamples, classical survival models may lead 
to a biased estimation (hazard models implicitly assume all cases will, sooner or later, 
experience the event of interest).11 To overcome this issue, we use a split-population hazard 
model (Bertrand et al. 2017; Prins and Verhoef 2007; Sinha and Chandrashekaran 1992).12  
We use a mixture model, consisting of a logistic regression for the proportion of 
new entrants that ‘never’ exit the market and a survival regression for those that do (see 
Dirick et al. 2017). We specify the logit part of the model as a function of pre-entry average 
market conditions (please see Appendix B) because they reflect the type and level of 
required resources that determine market survival in general, i.e., irrespective of time 
(Helfat and Lieberman 2002; Ito and Lee 2003). We model the hazard rate of a given 
challenger in quarter j as a function of the baseline hazard rate, and market- and firm-
specific factors. In line with other studies in marketing and strategy (Geroski, Mata, and 
Portugal 2010; Nikolaeva 2007; Risselada, Verhoef, and Bijmolt 2014), we also include in 
the hazard regression the incumbents’ marketing activities themselves and their interaction 
with time, which enables us to assess whether the effect of incumbents’ marketing-mix 
varies over time. Specifically, hi(tj) is specified as:  
hi(tj) = h0(tj)exp{β0 + β1IncPostPriceCutij + β2IncPostFreqij + β3IncPostPeakFreqij + β4IncPostOTPij 
+ β5[IncPostPriceCutij × f(tj)] + β6[IncPostFreqij × f(tj)] + β7[IncPostPeakFreqij × f(tj)] + 
                                                 
11 It is impossible to know, from observed data, whether a low-cost carrier will never exit a given route or is 
just right-censored. In the unlikely case that all carriers would exit, the split-population model would 
incorrectly identify some of them as being cured, i.e., never exit (see Jaggia 2011). This is more likely in 
short datasets. Because our dataset leaves plenty of time for those carriers that entered routes long time ago 
to exit them, we believe that a split-population model is more realistic than a hazard model that assumes the 
data are right-censored. 
12 While some challengers that remain in the route at the end of the observation period are likely to exit some 
time in the future, it is reasonable to assume that some will ‘always’ be immune to incumbents’ marketing-
mix reactions (but may still exit in the far future for other reasons). 
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β8[IncPostOTPij × f(tj)] + β9ChllgPriceij + β10ChllgSizeij + β11MMCij + β12Demandi + β13Hubij + 
β14NIncij + β15Distancei + β16FuelPricej + β17ChllgNetworkij + β18IncNetworkij + β192ndEntryi + 
β20-28IncChllgi + β29-48Yearj}                                                                                                             (1.1) 
 
where f(t) = t + t2 + Ln(t) is a flexible time function (Chandrasekaran and Tellis 2011) and 
the right-hand side independent variables are operationalized as described below. 
Time-variant Independent Variables in the Hazard Regression 
Price-Cut. we compute incumbents’ post-entry quarterly price-cuts, IncPostPriceCutij, as 
one minus the weighted average price on the route i in quarter j after entry divided by the 
weighted average price over eight pre-entry quarters, where incumbents’ market-shares 
serve as weights. The use of weights based on market shares ensures that the relative 
competitive strength (leader vs. followers) of incumbents in a market, and their impact on 
demand, is preserved (Dixit and Chintagunta 2007), and the use of a ratio accounts for pre- 
vs. post-entry differences.13 
Service convenience and service quality. Carriers offer consumers more 
convenient access to their service by increasing the frequency of flight departures in 
general (Berry and Jia 2010; Brueckner, Lee, and Singer 2013) and more flights in peak 
times in particular (Huse and Oliveira 2012). These factors affect passengers’ choice of 
airline because travelers are both price- and time-sensitive (Shaw 2007). Accordingly, the 
first of the incumbents’ service convenience measure in route i in quarter j, IncPostFreqij, 
is the average number of non-stop flights in quarter j post-entry divided by that in the pre-
                                                 
13 The use of market-share weighted averages assumes the low-cost entrant looks at the actions of a 
‘representative incumbent’ while still preserving market-share differences. In other words, the actions taken 
by say an undisputed market leader will show more strongly than those with negligible market shares. In 
such cases, a new entrant is likely to pay more attention to ‘who does what’ rather than second-order effects 
such as ‘who did what first and when’.  
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entry stage, using again market-shares as weights and eight pre-entry quarters. we do the 
same for IncPostPeakFreqij, the percentage of flights that depart during daily peak time, 
i.e., 7-10am or 3-7pm on weekdays (see Oliveira and Huse 2009; Sengupta and Wiggins 
2014).  
According to the marketing literature, one of the main indicators of service quality 
in the airline industry is the percentage of flights that arrive on-time (Grewal, 
Chandrashekaran, and Citrin 2010), which is available at route-level (see Prince and Simon 
2014). To measure the on-time performance variable IncPostOTPij, we use the market-
share weighted average of the percentage of incumbents’ flights on the route i in quarter j 
that arrive on-time.14  
In equation (1.1), the derivative of log(hi(tj)) with respect to incumbents’ price cut, 
flight frequency, peak-time flight frequency, and on-time-performance, is β1 + β5f(tj), β2 + 
β6f(tj), β3 + β7f(tj), and β4 + β8f(tj). If β5, β6, β7, and β8 are non-zero and significant, we find 
support for the post-entry time-variant effects of marketing tactics on time-to-exit. The 
main effect and the time interaction effect combined determine whether the direction or 
sign of the overall effect changes over time. For example, if the estimates for β1 and β5 are 
such that β1 + β5f(tj) is positive after entry and then turns negative, there is support for H1, 
suggesting that incumbents’ deeper post-entry price cuts lengthen a challenger’s expected 
time of exit at first, but they shorten it afterward (see Risselada, Verhoef, and Bijmolt 2014 
for a similar interpretation). 
                                                 
14 Since, on average, incumbents’ peak frequency and OTP did not change at the time of a challenger’s entry 
(see Figure A.1 in Appendix A), we do not use changes relative to the pre-entry period but only their levels. 
We re-estimated our model using peak and OTP reactions and our key findings are robust to these alternative 
model specifications.  
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Time-variant Control variables and market network structure. In equation (1.1), 
ChllgPriceij is the average one-way fare charged by the low-cost to its passengers on the 
route i in quarter j post-entry. ChllgSizeij is the natural log of the number of passengers that 
are carried by the challenger in quarter j. Demandi is the geometric mean of the population 
in the endpoint cities. NIncij is the total number of incumbents in route i in quarter j, and 
Distancei the distance between two endpoint airports for each route. 
Since fuel costs are one of the largest expenses for airlines and account for almost 
30% of their operating costs,15 we include quarterly FuelPricej in our model. And because 
airlines often compete against each other in many markets simultaneously, which 
influences their competitive behaviors (Baum and Korn 1996; Jayachandran, Gimeno, and 
Varadarajan 1999), we also control for a multimarket variable (MMC). Since there is a 
possibility that another low-cost challenger enters a market before the first entrant’s exit, 
and this second entry influences the first challenger’s exit timing, we also include a 
2ndEntryi variable in the hazard regression ( = 1 if a second low-cost challenger stepped in, 
zero otherwise). 
In the airline industry, what happens in one market – including who comes in and 
who leaves, and when – is not entirely independent from what happens in all other markets, 
since the different (geographical) markets are naturally connected by the very nature of 
routes linking any two airports, and some airports are more central than others. To account 
for this interdependency of the different markets, we control for and include in our 
econometric model a challenger and incumbents’ route importance or route centrality 




within an LCC’s network, ChllgNetworkij and IncNetworkij, respectively (Please see the 
Appendix D for a discussion of the operationalization of MMC and the route importance).  
 Finally, we include a set of yearly dummies Yearj to capture unobserved time-
varying macroeconomic factors such as shifts in demand and costs of production, and other 
unobserved time factors (Greenfield 2014). In addition to the incumbent- and challenger-
specific covariates, we also account for any unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity by 
implementing a fixed-effect model and include a set of challenger and incumbent dummies, 
IncChllgi, to capture potential unobserved incumbent- and new entrant-specific factors. 
Table 1.2 lists all control variables and how we operationalize them.  
Following common choices in cure models (see Jaggia 2011), we use a Weibull 
distribution in the baseline hazard function and a log(-log) link function in the incidence 
part. We estimate the model parameters in Stata using the command cureregr (which 
uses maximum likelihood estimation). We use route-level clustered standard errors that 
make our hypotheses testing more conservative and enable us to control for unobserved 
route-specific factors that might influence a challenger’s time-to-exit (Eilert et al. 2017; 
Panagopoulos et al. 2018).  
Endogeneity  
Before we mitigate concerns about the endogeneity of incumbents’ prices to the hazard 
function of the low-cost carrier (in which case the estimated price effect may be biased and 
inconsistent), we note the following. First, unobserved demand shock is not the primary 
driver of the results. If the demand drives the incumbent’s price and the challenger’s exit 
decision simultaneously, we should see incumbents dropped the prices less when the 
entrant’s exit likelihood is low, not the other way around. Second, it is unlikely that 
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incumbent carriers set prices based on a newcomer’s likelihood of exiting the market at a 
particular quarter (for a detailed discussion, please see Dixit and Chintagunta 2007, page 
162). We argue that if the incumbents set prices based on the entrant’s risk of staying-
in/exiting the market (rising prices when the exit likelihood is high), they should follow 
the same line of reason for their flight frequency (setting low flight frequency when the 
exit likelihood is high), however, we observed that incumbents follow two different paths 
with regards to price and frequency. Third, and although “there is no direct evidence from 
the firm side (for example, from pricing experiments) that endogeneity biases are large in 
panel or time-series data (Rossi 2014, p. 670),” we explicitly control for several demand 
factors common to both prices and newcomers’ time-to-exit in our model, namely route 
demand, ingredient costs (i.e., fuel prices), and competition information (number of 
incumbents in the market per quarter). Admittedly, other unobservable demand factors can 
be thought of but it is hard to imagine that those would have a larger impact on the 
dependent variable and would drive a larger portion of the variation in incumbents’ prices 
than the ones we observe and do include in the model (see Rossi 2014). Finally, we include 
route-, time-, incumbent-, and challenger-specific fixed effects that capture unobserved 
factors at these levels and will alleviate the endogeneity due to the omitted variables (Ebbes 
et al. 2016; Ketokivi and McIntosh 2017; Rossi 2014).   
Although before addressing an endogeneity, a strong and convincing argument 
must be made that there is first order endogeneity problem (Ketokivi and McIntosh 2017; 
Rossi 2014) - which we believe is not - still, to empirically explore whether price 
endogeneity is a major concern in the context of our nonlinear hazard model and investigate 
the robustness of our findings more formally, we follow Risselada, Verhoef, and Bijmolt 
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(2014) and Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008) approaches. We implement a two-stage 
residual inclusion estimation method (2SRI) using instrumental variables, which is an 
extension of the popular two-stage least squares (2SLS). Our analysis suggests that price 
is not endogenous (Please see Appendix C for the comprehensive discussion of 2SRI 
method). In this situation, Ebbes et al. (2016) recommend that results that come from a 
regression without the instrument should be used for inference. Accordingly, in the next 
section, we report the findings from our initial model specification, treating price as an 
exogenous factor.16 
RESULTS 
Table 1.3 presents the results of the split-population hazard model that estimates the impact 
of incumbents’ marketing tactics on, simultaneously, the challenger post-entry exit 
likelihood and the challenger’s time-to-exit. The fit of the model is significantly better than 
one with no marketing variables (χ2(16) = 337.09, p < .01) and better than a model without 
a flexible polynomial time function (χ2(12) = 349.68, p < .01). Notice that the model is 
parameterized in such a way that a positive coefficient in the logit or incidence regression 
implies a positive effect on the challenger’s exit likelihood, while a positive coefficient in 
the hazard or latency regression implies a positive effect on the hazard rate, i.e., a negative 
effect on exit timing, as the expected time for a market exit is shortened. We first present 
briefly the results in the exit likelihood part of the model and then turn to the results in the 
exit timing, which is our main focus. In the latter, we are particularly interested in knowing 
whether time moderates the effect of incumbents’ marketing-mix – in terms of prices and 
                                                 
16 We also tested for the endogeneity of flight frequency using “ConnPass” as an IV. We followed the same 
procedure and found that the p-value associated with the residual coefficient was not significant (p > .1) 
indicating that endogeneity of service convenience is also not a big concern. 
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service – on a new entrant’s exit timing (see Figure 1.1) and, if it does, in the way we 
predicted.  
Exit likelihood. The results from the logit part of the model reveal that the higher 
the challenger’s quarterly prices, the lower the exit likelihood (γChallgrPrice = -.00860, p < 
.05), which may be seen as a sign that the market is financially attractive. The overall exit 
likelihood of a low-cost challenger is also significantly affected by route pre-entry 
marketing environment. Specifically, the higher the incumbents’ pre-entry prices, the 
lower the low-cost challenger’s exit likelihood (γIncPrePrice = -.00936, p < .05), possibly 
because, at the time of entry, the new entrant’s low-cost proposition was a particularly 
compelling one among price-sensitive consumers that higher priced mainstream carriers 
were not serving effectively. The effects of incumbents’ pre-entry service are mixed, 
however. Low-cost challengers were less likely to leave a market where incumbents were 
offering a higher flight frequency at the time of entry (γIncPreFreq = -.00327, p < .05), which 
suggests the market was underserved, yet they were more likely to leave markets where 
incumbents were using larger aircraft at the time of entry (γIncPrePlaneSize = 9.20400, p < .01), 
a level of quality that new low-cost entrants were perhaps not ready to compete with.  
Exit timing (or time-to-exit). we start by describing the results regarding the effects 
of control variables that may be confounded with the effect of incumbents’ marketing 
tactics on the exit timing of a low-cost entrant. As indicated in Table 1.3, control variables 
are measured at route-, challenger- and network-levels and some are time-variant (e.g., 
number of incumbents and fuel price).  
Control variables. All control variables but one (whether there is an incumbent’s 
hub in one of the two endpoint cities; p > .10) are highly significant explaining a new 
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entrant’s exit timing. We briefly discuss these results. A challenger’s price has a negative 
and significant effect on the hazard rate, i.e. it increases the expected timing of exit 
(βChallgrPrice = -.00137, p < .01), in line with its effect on exit likelihood irrespective of time, 
as described before. A challenger’s size, however, has the opposite effect (i.e., a positive 
significant effect on the hazard rate): larger challengers tend to exit sooner (βChallgrSize = 
.00009, p < .01), perhaps an indication of ‘too heavy a load’. All market-level 
characteristics – whether there has been a second challenger entering the market (β2ndEntry 
= .22832, p < .01), the larger the distances traveled (βDistance = .00965, p < .01); a larger 
number of incumbents (βNInc = .10274, p < .01) and of other markets where the challenger 
faces the competition of the same incumbents (βMMC = .36974, p < .01); and higher fuel 
prices – significantly shorten the exit timing. These effects could be expected from an 
economic point of view. For instance, the cost efficiency of low-cost challengers compared 
to that of mainstream incumbents shows up more strongly on shorter travel distances as 
longer routes become too costly to serve (Joskow, Werden, and Johnson 1994). Not 
surprisingly, the exception is market demand, which decreases the hazard rate, i.e., 
lengthens the exit timing of the new low-cost entrant (βDemand = -.20187, p < .01). Similarly, 
the importance or centrality of a route within the challenger’s network has a significant and 
negative effect on the hazard rate (βChllgNetwork = -1.56558, p < .01), meaning the expected 
time to exit is longer. Conversely, the more the route is important to the incumbents, the 
sooner the challenger’s exit time (βIncNetwork = .00275, p < .01). 
Incumbent’s price cuts, service convenience, and service quality. As reported in 
Table 1.3, incumbents’ post-entry marketing elements have a significant effect on a new 
entrant’s hazard rate and, consequently, on its exit timing. While service convenience, i.e., 
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flight frequency during regular-time (βIncPostFreq = .32821, p < .01; but not during peak-time, 
p > .10) has a positive effect on the hazard rate, i.e., it shortens the entrant’s expected time 
to exit, both price cuts (βIncPostPriceCut = -1.43601, p < .01) and service quality (on-time 
performance; βIncPostOTP = -1.51105, p < .01) negatively affect the hazard rate, i.e., they 
lengthen the entrant’s expected time to exit. These main effects are only part of a larger 
story, however. As our results reveal, the passage of time has a significant moderating 
effect on the relationship between incumbents’ post-entry marketing elements and a new 
low-cost entrant time-to-exit.  
In Figure 1.3, we plot the overtime effects of the incumbents’ tactics on the 
challenger’s TTE with corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The overall effects of 
incumbents’ marketing elements on a challenger’s exit timing as time goes by take different 
shapes. The effects of incumbents’ post-entry price-cuts have a U-shape over time (top-left 
of Figure 1.3), as they first lengthen the challenger’s expected time to exit until roughly 
quarter 10 (i.e., estimated overall effect on the challenger’s exit timing is positive though 
decreasing) and then shorten it almost until the end (i.e., estimated overall effect on exit 
timing is negative though increasing), which supports H1.  
The effect of incumbents’ post-entry flight frequency has somewhat of an S-shape 
over time (bottom-left of Figure 1.3). At first, and until roughly quarter 10, it shortens the 
challenger’s expected time to exit. Afterward, and until approximately quarter 50, its 95% 
CIs include zero, i.e., the estimated overall effect on exit timing is not significant. It then 
lengthens the expected exit time until the end of the observation period. This result lends 
only partial support to H2. 
25 
 
The effect of incumbents’ post-entry peak-time flight frequency has an inverted U-
shape (top-right of Figure 1.3): it is non-significant at first (the estimates include zero 
within the 95% CI); it lengthens the expected time to exit until about quarter 55, and it 
becomes insignificant again afterward. Perhaps increasing peak-time frequency is a sign of 
incumbents’ strengthening their core positioning among business customers (Kumar 2006; 
Wang and Shaver 2014), which is not the typical target market of low-cost carriers. 
Competition is thus less intense, and the challenger has a higher chance of survival. 
The effect of incumbents’ post-entry flight on-time performance (i.e., service 
quality) on exit timing is monotonically decreasing over time (bottom-right of Figure 1.3); 
It is increasingly negative, i.e., it increasingly shortens the expected time to exit after 
quarter 5, before which it has the opposite effect (i.e., the estimated overall effect on exit 
timing is positive though decreasing). As we mentioned earlier, the initial stage after the 
entry is characterized by high uncertainty and challenger will gather and interpret any 
market signal to reduce its uncertainty regarding the new market. Hsieh et al. (2015) 
indicate that firms usually consider competitors as external reference points and use any 
signal from them (both intended and unintended signals) to justify future decisions. One of 
the main concerns of LCCs is to keep the turnaround time as low as possible (Berry and 
Jia 2010) because it enables them to reduce its cost per each seat-mile. In the case of high 
delay, the challenger cannot benefit from this advantage and serving that market will be 
costly. Since a big portion of delays might be due to the other airport-level factors that are 
out of the airline’s control, when large and established incumbents perform poorly (i.e., 
high delay) in the market despite having more resources and capabilities, managers of a 
challenger firm may infer that the conditions in the new market is unduly challenging, 
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therefore, they may not have a sufficient resource and capability to contest in the new 
market and have a lower chance to achieve their desired goals. In this situation, “larger 
competitors’ negative performance will create an unfavorable expectation for return on 
commitment,” (Hsieh et al. 2015, p.43) therefore, further resource commitment is no longer 
justifiable, and a new entrant might decide to exit the market. In sum, our results lend 
support for H1, partial support for H2, and support for H3 in about quarter 5 and beyond. 
We discuss the implications of our findings next. 
Robustness Checks 
Market definition in the airline industry. Although several studies using airline data have 
defined a market as a route between two airports, prior literature has questioned this 
definition when one of the endpoints is a large metropolitan area with multiple commercial 
airports (Brueckner, Lee, and Singer 2014). The issue is whether these multiple airports 
are representing a single destination for passengers, or each of them should be considered 
as a separate destination (Brueckner, Lee, and Singer 2014). To explore how market 
definition (city-pairs vs. airport-pairs) may affect our findings, we treat multiple airports 
in large cities as a single destination (origin) by grouping them as suggested in Brueckner, 
Lee, and Singer (2014). For instance, the routes from the three airports in New York 
(Newark, John F. Kennedy, and La Guardia) to Atlanta, were grouped as a single route, 
New York-Atlanta. We re-analyzed our model using a new set of market entry and exit 
observations and find that our key findings are not sensitive to city-pairs vs. airport-pairs 
market definition (see Table 1.4-column 1). 
Flight OTP specifications. Also, to test the sensitivity of our results to the 
definition of flight delay, we re-estimate our model using two alternative measures 
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suggested by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and used in previous studies: an 
arrival at destination 15 and 30 minutes late (as the proportion of incumbents’ flights on 
route i in quarter j that arrive that late; see Prince and Simon 2014). The results suggest 
that our key findings are not driven by the definition of delay (Table 1.4 - columns 2 and 
3). 
Southwest and AirTran merger. In 2011, Southwest acquired AirTran, the second 
largest LCC in the U.S. airline industry. From that point on, such major network 
restructuring might have influenced Southwest and AirTran time-to-exit decisions – 
something we should avoid being confounded with our focal marketing tactics. Thus, to 
rule out an alternative explanation due to this event, we conducted our analysis using a 
subsample that excludes all exit events that occurred after 2011. To make sure our results 
are robust to the cut-off year, we also re-estimated our model on other subsamples using 
2010 and 2012 as cut-off points. The results indicate that our key findings are robust to the 
LCC merger in the U.S. airline industry (Table 1.4-column 4). 
Southwest as a low-cost or as a major carrier. Although Southwest was originally, 
and in our observation period, a low-cost carrier, it grew significantly and became the 
number one carrier in the US in terms of number of domestic passengers (Dixit and 
Chintagunta 2007). Thus, one might argue that Southwest is no longer a low-cost carrier, 
and it is more like a major carrier that might behave differently from other low-cost carriers, 
and the factors that affect its survival may be different. Following Dixit and Chintagunta 
(2007), we also analyzed the data without Southwest entry-exit observations. Since the 
effects of key covariates are similar, we present the results considering Southwest as a low-
cost carrier (Table 1.4-column 5). 
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Challenger’s post-entry marketing strategies. Low-cost carriers have been 
reporting their flight fares to DOT since 1990; however, they started reporting OTP and 
flight frequency data at different points in time during our observation period. Thus, these 
variables were missing during the post-entry period for more than 60% of route-challenger 
observations. Given this limitation, in our model, we just controlled for a challenger’s 
price. However, as a robustness check, we re-analyzed our model on a subsample of routes 
where flight frequency and OTP data were available for challengers in the entire post-entry 
period. Our key findings are robust to this model specification – and the results of this 
additional analysis indicate that a challenger’s higher flight frequency reduces its exit 
likelihood, whereas OTP and peak frequency do not significantly affect its time-to-exit 
(Table 1.4-column 6). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Prior research has shown that incumbents usually react to a rival’s market entry by 
adjusting their marketing tactics (Goolsbee and Syverson 2008; Luoma, et al. 2018; 
Shankar 1997). However, there is little evidence regarding how these adjustments affect 
the entrants’ post-entry exit. Drawing from the related notion of action irreversibility and 
information economics, the primary purpose of this study was to examine the link between 
incumbents’ marketing tactics and a challenger’s exit likelihood, over time and at the 
market level. Next, we summarize our main findings and contributions. 
Research Contributions 
From a theoretical perspective, by examining the link between a challenger’s time-to-exit 
and incumbents’ marketing-mix, our research offers new insights into the market exit 
literature and addresses calls of prior researchers for an investigation into other factors that 
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might influence market survival (Dixit and Chintagunta 2007). Our findings suggest that 
incumbents’ marketing tactics related to price, service quality, and service convenience 
impact a challenger’s exit timing, and that the time elapsed after entry works as a moderator 
of those effects.  
Specifically, the results of this study indicate that while incumbents’ price cuts 
increase the challenger’s exit likelihood later after entry, they reduce the exit likelihood 
early after entry. On the other hand, incumbents might be better off by not investing in their 
quality immediately after a low-cost carrier has challenged their market, because our results 
indicate that the lower their levels of service quality, the higher is the challenger’s exit 
likelihood early after entry. This finding, though seemingly counterintuitive, may help 
explain why incumbent airlines have been seen to not improve quality in response to the 
entry of a low-cost carrier (Prince and Simon 2014). We believe the deeper study of this 
phenomenon in future research is warranted. Moreover, the findings of our research 
indicate that investments of incumbents in service convenience increase the challenger’s 
exit likelihood early after entry.  
Previous studies in marketing have highlighted the importance of service 
convenience and noted that empirical research should pay more attention to the concept of 
service convenience as a construct in its own right (Collier and Sherrell 2010; Farquhar 
and Rowley 2009; Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml 2004). By drawing a distinction between 
service quality and service convenience, our study is among the first to empirically 
investigate the link between service convenience and a new entrant’s exit decision. As 
such, our findings contribute to the service convenience literature (Collier and Sherrell 
2010; Farquhar and Rowley 2009; Obeng, et al. 2016; Seiders et al. 2007) by recognizing 
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service investment and in particular convenience investments as a strategic weapon at a 
firm’s disposal that can be effectively employed in a competitive environment to protect 
markets against a rival’s attack.  
The findings of our work may also suggest a new rationale for why a delayed 
reaction might be an optimal strategy for incumbents. Several empirical studies have found 
that incumbents sometimes delay their reactions to a challenger’s market entry and 
underscore firm inertia, lack of managerial capability, capacity limitation and so on as 
factors that cause this delayed response (Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Robinson 1988). 
Kalra, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (1998), however, have proposed that incumbents’ immediate 
reactions in the form of price cuts are an implicit acknowledgment of the entrant’s high 
quality and enhance the attractiveness of the challenger’s product to customers. Similarly, 
we suggest that incumbents’ immediate reactions might send mixed signals with regards 
to market attractiveness, thereby increasing the new entrant’s uncertainty about the market 
condition. In this situation, the challenger is likely to delay an exit decision until more 
accurate information is gathered and hence incumbents may be better off not reacting or at 
least delaying their pricing responses to the entry.  
Moreover, Luoma et al. (2018) indicate that since it might be hard to justify the 
subsequent price increase after the new entrant’s exit, aggressive price reaction to the entry 
might have a persistent negative impact on the incumbent’s profitability. Drawing on firm 
managers’ competitive reasoning, our study provides a novel firm-level reason for why 




From a methodological perspective, we applied the cure model to study market 
survival throughout the post-entry stages. Unlike typical survival models, the cure model 
does not assume that the survival function goes to zero as time goes to infinity, i.e., it does 
not assume that all subjects will eventually experience the event of interest. Accordingly, 
in our research context several firms probably do not leave the market they have entered 
and continue to serve it for a very long time. While we account for a proportion of 
challengers that do not leave the market, the cure model enables us to simultaneously 
explore the factors that impact the probability of exit and those that impact the timing of 
the exit. 
Finally, because airlines operate over a network – i.e., their markets are connected 
their exit decisions in one market may depend on and influence the exit decisions in another 
market. In other words, the importance of each market (i.e., route) is evaluated not only by 
its stand-alone profitability but also by the passenger-flow contribution that it brings to the 
carrier’s total carried passengers (Boguslaski, Ito, and Lee 2004; Dunn 2008). Thus, we 
included in our econometric model measures that described network structure and assessed 
their impacts on the firm’s survival. We find that the higher the route importance within 
the challenger’s network, the less likely it is that a challenger will leave that market. 
However, the higher the route centrality within the incumbent’s network, the higher would 
be a challenger’s exit likelihood.  
Managerial and Policy Implications 
Our study has implications for both managers and policymakers. When and how to allocate 
limited resources to defend markets under attack has long been a vital question for 
marketing managers. This research suggests that managers should choose carefully the 
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type, the timing, and the intensity of their defensive responses to entry and offer valuable 
insights for practitioners to efficiently assign marketing expenditures. More specifically, 
our findings delineate that aggressive price-cut although is the easiest and fastest way of 
response, may not be the most efficient strategy to repel the new entrant in the short run. 
By cutting prices, incumbents intentionally signal their production efficiency to the 
challenger to make the market less attractive. However, since the price-cut represents less 
credible and unsustainable strategy, the challenger may interpret this action as an 
opportunity in a market worth defending. So, in this situation, the challenger receives a 
mixed signal that increases uncertainty. As such, a newcomer is prone to stay longer and 
let additional time go by to gain more information from the market (i.e., encouraged to 
‘wait and see’); the passage of time reduces uncertainty, enabling the entrant firm to make 
a better prediction about the future of the market (Haenlein, Kaplan, and Schoder 2006; 
O’Brien and Folta 2009). Thus, we recommend managers to avoid deep immediate price-
cut in response to the entry and advocate for implementing service-based strategies along 
with a low to moderate price cut to repel a low-cost entrant.  
The findings of this research indicate that incumbents’ post-entry strategies are vital 
determinants of the challenger’s survival and suggest that the new entrant will be much 
better off if it anticipates the incumbents’ actions in response to the entry. However, 
marketing scholars argue that managers usually cannot accurately predict incumbents’ 
activities and there is uncertainty and ambiguity associated with incumbents’ reactions to 
the market entry (Chen et al. 2002; Montgomery, Moore, and Urbany 2005). Our research 
provides managers with a better tool to identify markets with a higher chance of survival 
regardless of how incumbents react to market entry. For instance, for firms entering new 
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markets, our findings suggest that pre-entry market environment (i.e., history of 
incumbents’ prior strategies and available resources) is an important factor that might 
affect the challenger’s survival and must be investigated carefully before making any entry 
decision. Also, from the perspective of an airline entering a new market, the findings 
suggest that potential new entrants should not be deterred by incumbents offering a higher 
service convenience if other market factors look favorable.  
This study might also provide valuable insights for policymakers. One of the main 
roles of policymakers is to promote a fair competitive environment for the benefit of 
consumers. For instance, antitrust laws prevent anti-competitive strategies and protect 
firms in the case of predatory behavior in response to market entries. Marketing scholars 
define predatory pricing as an incumbent’s deliberate price cut, usually below cost or at an 
unprofitable level, to squeeze a challenger out of the market (Guiltinan and Gundlach 
1996). Our findings reveal, however, that cutting prices in response to entry does not  
reduce competition, at least not immediately. But price-cut strategies might still be a 
concern for policymakers if they persist long after entry – as we showed, at that time they 
do drive challengers out of the market. 
Limitations and Future Research 
While this study provides novel insights into firm survival, it also faces limitations that 
open the way to future research. The fact that the study is limited to the airline industry 
implies that the results may apply in another industry somewhat differently. However, 
using data from a single industry allows us to eliminate any confounding effects from 




Furthermore, although we explored how the type and the timing of incumbents’ 
marketing activities help them protect their markets, an interesting opportunity for future 
research lies in examining the long-term and indirect effects of the incumbents’ marketing 
efforts. Clark and Montgomery (1998) indicate that an incumbent’s willingness and ability 
to defend its market enhance its reputation as a “credible defender,” and this reputation will 
deter potential entrants from attacking incumbents’ markets in the future. It would, 
therefore, be important to empirically investigate the long-term and indirect effect of 
incumbents’ defensive actions on their performance. In other words, to what extent do 
incumbents’ marketing actions in the face of entry deter potential entrants from entering in 
the future? Understanding the answers to these questions is important for both managers 
and policy-makers. 
In addition, we defined a market exit as a complete withdrawal from the market 
(operationalized as a binary variable). However, instead of complete withdrawal, 
challengers might decide on major downscaling of participation (i.e., reducing the number 
of seats available to the customer or flight frequency) while remaining in the market 
(Boeker et al. 1997). It would be useful to include information about the level of 
participation in a particular route and investigate how the incumbents’ activities affect the 
challenger’s service scale. Doing so would give us a better understanding of the difference 
between a complete exit from the market and a significant change in the level of 
participation in that market. 
Marketing and strategy literature classifies the post-entry period into three distinct 
stages: (1) an immediately after entry (retaliation or entry) stage; (2) an intermediate 
sequencing stage; and (3) a long-after-entry (competition or post-entry) stage (Gatignon, 
35 
 
Anderson, and Helsen 1989; Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996; Homburg et al. 2013; 
Porter1985).  Since each stage has certain characteristics, a challenger’s vulnerability to 
the incumbents’ actions might vary over these three stages. Thus, another promising 
avenue for future research is to empirically identify these three stages and investigate how 
the effect of incumbents’ marketing-mix on a new entrant’s time-to-exit varies across these 
stages. 
Moreover, following prior studies in the airline industry, we used ‘on-time 
performance’ (OTP) as a measure of service quality and both regular and peak time flight 
frequency as measures of service convenience. However, incumbents could improve other 
aspects of service quality such as mishandling baggage, legroom, and in-flight amenities. 
An operationalization of service quality that includes other measures would advance our 
current state of knowledge on the effects of incumbents’ service quality on a new entrant’s 
exit likelihood.  
Furthermore, understanding how loyalty programs could influence incumbents’ 
marketing activities effectiveness over the post-entry period is another valuable direction 
for future research inquiry. For example, if an incumbent possesses a valuable and strong 
loyalty program, a price drop or an improvement in service would attract more customers 
to the program. Exploring this question will shed more light on the indirect effect of loyalty 
programs on firm performance through its impact on competitor’s behavior.  
Finally, we acknowledge that our theorizing would suggest a policy-invariant 
structural economic model with sequential decisions made under uncertainty capturing a 
strategic market environment where the beliefs incumbents and entrants about each other’s 
actions matter. Future research could develop and test more flexible dynamic structural 
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models addressing underlying sequential decision-making process. In this study, we took 
a step in that direction and hope our findings stimulate further interest in the study of the 
market exit phenomenon as a dynamic process involving time-dependent interactions 










































































































Notes: Hazard regression estimates were multiplied by -1 to depict the effect on exit timing (in the vertical axis). Post-entry quarters are 
depicted in the horizontal axis. The solid line represents the average estimated effect, dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
The Stata lincom command was used to generate mean effects and confidence intervals for each quarter as specified in Equation (1.1), 
i.e. using the sum of marketing main effects with their interaction with a flexible polynomial time function (t + t2 + Ln(t)). Stata uses the 
variance-covariance matrix to estimate the standard errors associated with these quarterly overall marketing effects. 
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Method Key Learnings 
Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 
(2004) 




Network externalities negatively affect the 
survival duration of pioneer entrants. 








First-mover with a ‘really’ new product 
has a high failure rate. Whereas the first 
mover that introduces an incremental 
innovation can enjoy higher survival 
likelihood. 










Introducing products with the newest 
available technology increases survival 
likelihood. Entrant’s pre-entry experience 
and entry timing moderate the link. 
Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) Firm, product  No No AFT model 
Business profitability, scale, and scope 
(product line breadth) during a baseline 
period contribute to long-term business 
survival. 










While challenger’s price affects its exit 






No Yes DTH model 
Publicly traded firms and digital products 
increase survival in the beginning, but not 
sustainable. Inverted-U between exit rate 
and age. Survival decreases with 







a time of entry increases with economic 
growth. 







Smaller firms more successful in entering 
emerging markets. The entry that involves 
high levels of control (e.g., owned 
subsidiaries) more successful than low 
levels (e.g., licensing). 









Early entry is beneficial only for pioneers 
that are technically strong. However, 
pioneers that are low on technological 
capabilities suffer from poor survival 
rates. 








Larger firms survive longer and this effect 
is ‘almost permanent.’ Effect of 
concentration at the time of entry has a 
strong negative effect on survival. 
However, the effect disappears 
immediately after entry. Impact of initial 
human capital seems to be permanent too. 
Wang, Chen, and Xie (2010) 
Order of entry, 
market, product  
No No AFT model 
Pioneers are likely to enjoy a survival 
advantage when their product is cross-
generation compatible but within-
generation incompatible. 
Homburg, Fürst, Ehrmann, and 
Scheinker (2013) 




The success of incumbent’s investments 
aimed at squeezing entrants out of the 
market depends on the length of the 
product life cycle (PLC). 




U-shaped relationship between new 
entrant’s growth rate and the likelihood of 








Chadwick, Guthrie, and Xing (2016) Firm No No DTH model 
Presence of an HR executive on firms’ 
TMTs at the time of entry is related to the 
firm survival 












Incumbents’ price-cuts delay 
newcomer’s time-to-exit first, speed it 
up afterward. Incumbents’ service 
convenience speeds up newcomer’s exit 
time first delay it afterward. 




























The average price over 8 pre-entry quarters and across all 
incumbents in route i. 
IncPreFreqi 
Average flight frequency over 8 pre-entry quarters and across 
all incumbents in route i. 
IncPrePeakFreqi 
The average percentage of flights during peak hours over 8 
pre-entry quarters and across all incumbents in route i. 
IncPreOTPi 
The average percentage of On-time flights over 8 pre-entry 
quarters and across all incumbents in route i 
IncPrePlaneSizei 
An average number of aircraft seats over 8 pre-entry quarters 























Market-share weighted average price-cut across all 
incumbents in quarter j post-entry divided by IncPrePricei. 
IncPostFreqij 
Market-share weighted average flight frequency across all 
incumbents in quarter j post-entry divided by IncPreFreqi. 
IncPostPeakFreqij 
The market-share weighted average percentage of flights 
during peak hours across all incumbents in quarter j post-entry. 
IncPostOTPij 
The market-share weighted average percentage of on-time 















Equals 1 if one of the endpoint airports of route i is an 
incumbent’s hub, 0 otherwise. 
Distancei Distance between two endpoint airports of route i in 100 miles. 
(MMCij) 
A number of routes within the challenger’s network where the 
challenger faces the same incumbents in route i, divided by the 
challenger’s number of routes.  
ChllgSizeij 
A total number of passengers in quarter j traveling with the 
challenger that entered route i over its entire network. 
Demandi 
The geometric mean of the population of the endpoint cities in 
route i. 
ChllgNetworkij 
A number of routes in quarter j that originate from the two 
endpoints of route i divided by the challenger’s network size. 
IncNetworkij 
A number of routes in quarter j that originate from the two 
endpoints of route i divided by the incumbents’ network size. 
NIncij Number of incumbents in route i in quarter j. 
2ndEntryi 
Equals 1 if a 2nd challenger entered route i while the first 
challenger is still in the route, 0 otherwise. 





TABLE 1.3: Split-population Model Results 







Price-cut -1.43601 0.18469 
Flight frequency 0.32821 0.07477 
Peak flight frequency 0.17922 0.25985 
Flight OTP -1.51105 0.33487 
Flexible time function × 
Incumbents post-entry 
marketing 
t × Price-cut -0.00214 0.01545 
t × Flight frequency 0.03080 0.01174 
t × Peak flight frequency -0.08110 0.02861 
t × Flight OTP -0.07941 0.04425 
t2 × Price-cut -0.00023 0.00015 
t2 × Flight frequency -0.00043 0.00015 
t2 × Peak flight frequency 
frequencyfrequency 
0.00105 0.00033 
t2 × Flight OTP 0.00099 0.00054 
Ln(t) × Price-cut 0.61842 0.14333 
Ln(t) × Flight frequency -0.24345 0.06873 
Ln(t) × Peak flight frequency 
frequency 
0.20185 0.22261 




Price -0.00137 0.00036 
Size 0.00009 0.00001 
Market-level 
characteristics 
2nd Entry 0.22832 0.06477 
Hub -0.00308 0.02649 
Distance 0.00965 0.00286 
Multi Market Competition 0.36974 0.11589 
Fuel Price 0.10357 0.01757 
Route Demand -0.20187 0.02997 
Number of Incumbents 0.10274 0.02882 
Network-level 
characteristics 
Challenger Route Importance -1.56558 0.19847 







Price  -0.00936 0.00367 
Flight Frequency -0.00327 0.00139 
Peak flight frequency  1.67274 1.55800 
Flight OTP  -2.43487 1.81448 




Price -0.00860 0.00345 
 
N=13057; *p < .10,  **p < .05,  ***p < .01; Shape parameter = 1.624*** (S.E. = .0527), AIC = 
3,015.9, BIC = 3,494.4. Notes: Intercept estimates are removed from the table for the sake of space 
(Intercept Prob. of exit = -5.36** (2.218), Intercept Time-to exit = -1.78*** (.122)). Three incumbent 
Fixed Effects (US, DL, NW) are significant at 5%, all challenger dummies (WN, B6, FL, F9) and 
are significant. All year-dummies are also significant at 1%. UA: United Airline, AA: American 
Airlines, US: US Airways. DL: Delta Airlines, NW: North West Airlines, CO: Continental Airlines,  







TABLE 1.4: Robustness Checks 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
Exit 
Likelihood 
Pre-entry Price -0.00876  -0.00946 ** -0.00814 * -0.01332 ** -0.00167  -0.01487  
Pre-entry Frequency -0.00119  -0.00197  -0.00163 * -0.00732 ** -0.00138  0.00867 * 
Pre-entry Peak frequency 1.25812  1.85325  0.47514  1.22358  1.82955  -8.28377 * 
Pre-entry flight OTP -10.38112  -8.70457 *** -7.98547 *** -6.83955 *** -10.65558 *** 5.66677  
Pre-entry Plane Size -0.02762 * -0.04421 *** -0.03680 *** -0.02715 *** -0.02707 * 0.00653  
 Challenger Price -0.00916  -0.00455  -0.00299  -0.00454  -0.00817  0.04867 ** 
Time-To-
Exit 
Post-entry price-cut -1.42000 *** -1.67152 *** -1.78225 *** -1.41558 *** -1.43000 *** -2.05875 *** 
Flight frequency 0.44424 *** 0.30221 *** 0.28158 *** 0.28258  0.17921  0.23136 *** 
Peak flight frequency 0.36352  0.23774  0.08891  0.05315  0.46611 * -0.47258  
Flight OTP -1.11948 *** -2.42433 *** -4.02122 *** -1.42025 *** -1.33414 *** -0.76858 * 
t × Post-entry price-cut -0.00561  -0.01416  -0.01991  -0.05151  0.00132  -0.25722 *** 
t × Flight frequency 0.04065 *** 0.01685  0.01297  0.03885 * 0.00799  0.07235  
t × Peak flight frequency -0.03080  -0.08738 *** -0.11425 *** -0.10225 *** -0.02944  -0.26647 * 
t × Flight OTP 0.00924  -0.20165 ** -0.43774 *** 0.04425  0.07514 * -0.11885  
t2 × Post-entry price-cut -0.00015  -0.00001  -0.00004  0.00048  0.00039 ** -0.00491  
t2 × Flight frequency -0.00050 *** -0.00023  -0.00019  -0.00072 *** -0.00008  -0.00258  
t2 × Peak flight frequency 
timesq 
0.00029  0.00118 *** 0.00154 *** 0.00143 *** 0.00017  0.00455  
t2 × Flight OTP -0.00014  0.00288 ** 0.00611 *** -0.00104 * 0.00117 ** -0.00071  
Ln(t) × Post-entry price-cut 0.60847 *** 0.76458 *** 0.83814 *** 0.84652 *** 0.69958 *** 1.83025 *** 
Ln(t) × Flight frequency -0.33754 *** -0.18621 * -0.16352 * -0.26325 * -0.10775  -0.30158 ** 
Ln(t) × Peak flight frequency -0.05644  0.18811  0.35135  0.35425  -0.11912  1.00355 ** 
Ln(t) × Flight OTP 0.72612 ** 2.13832 *** 3.81745 *** 0.75845 ** 1.06125 *** 0.22487  
Challenger Price -0.00121 *** -0.00134 *** -0.00143 *** -0.00035  -0.00150 *** -0.00050 ** 
2ndEntry 0.12124 *** 0.24825 *** 0.25887 *** 0.28912 *** 0.14925 *** 0.11758 *** 
Hub 0.01348  -0.00983  -0.02516  -0.02422  -0.02563  -0.02137  
Distance 0.00046  0.00781 ** 0.00787 ** 0.00102  0.00027  0.00103  
Multi-Market Competition 0.06294  0.34815 *** 0.27345 ** 0.14802  0.39525 *** 0.14114  
FuelPrice 0.08886 *** 0.10624 *** 0.10485 ** 0.20522 *** 0.09454 *** 0.06634 *** 
Challenger Size 0.00009 *** 0.00011 *** 0.00011 *** 0.00004 ** 0.00011 *** 0.00005 *** 
Route Demand -0.14145 *** -0.19225 *** -0.19421 *** -0.07122 ** -0.15225 *** -0.08235 *** 
Challenger Route Importance -1.34168 *** -1.61357 *** -1.60457 *** -0.83912 *** -1.50454 *** -0.95885 *** 
Incumbent Route Importance 0.00293 *** 0.00249 *** 0.00245 *** 0.00061  0.00255 *** 0.00151 *** 
Number of Incumbent 0.06677 ** 0.11225 *** 0.10015 *** 0.01221  0.11511 *** 0.05644 *** 
 Observations 16209  13057 
 




ESSAY 2: BLUFF OR REAL? HELPING INCUMBENTS RECOGNIZE 
HOW A REALLY THREATENING FIRM LOOKS LIKE17 
 
“… All warfare is the way of deception. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; create havoc in the east and strike in the 
west …” (Tzu 1963) 
 
Informed by probability and psychology, in the opening poker scene of the 1965 movie 
“The Cincinnati Kid”, Steve McQueen’s character is able to read the bluff in Buster’s face 
(his opponent) and – instead of dropping the game and against everybody’s disbelief – 
make the call and collect ‘all the cash in the pot.’ Bluff which is defined as strategic 
deception, is a tactic that poker players, military generals, or politicians use – and so do 
managers – to mislead opponents about their true plans (Hendricks and McAfee 2006). In 
business as in poker, “bluff is a common strategic move” used to influence competitors to 
take, or not take, a specific course of action that leaves them worse off (Porter 1980; Prabhu 
and Stewart 2001).18  
Besides well-known ‘verbal bluffing’ using pre-announcements,19 firms can also 
deceive competitors by means of their observable moves (Prasad Mishra and Bhabra 2001). 
For instance, firms often use maneuvers to camouflage their true intentions and plans when 
trying to enter a new market (McGrath, Chen and MacMillan 1998; Hendricks and McAfee
                                                 
17 Aghaie, Sina., Carlos Lourenço, Charles Noble and Rafael Arreola. To be submitted to Marketing Science 
18 See https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/to-bluff-or-not-to-bluff. Companies may also use bluff 
on other stakeholders such as customers (Porter 1980; Prabhu and Stewart 2001). 
19 In the software industry, Microsoft Inc. frequently announced new products that never appeared on the 







1998). Using this strategy, a potential entrant (PE hereafter) may threaten multiple markets 
to increase an incumbent firm’s uncertainty about which market is, and which one is not, a 
real target market for the PE. In this situation, an incumbent firm that usually reacts to these 
entry threats to deter future entry (Ellison and Ellison 2011; Homburg et al. 2013) is forced 
to allocate its limited resources to the multiple markets that are, possibly, under threat. 
Consequently, it will have fewer resources to react when a market entry does occur, and 
the absence of resources will reduce the incumbent’s ability to retaliate at a time the PE is 
most vulnerable in a new market. In other words, by better predicting a real threat vs. a 
bluff, an incumbent could mitigate over- and under-reaction to market-entry threats.  
Usually, incumbent firms face several market entry threats simultaneously, but 
because resources are limited, they cannot respond to every one of those threats: they would 
like to ignore irrelevant threats and react to only important ones. Thus, recognizing the type 
of threat a firm is facing is one of the most crucial decisions in marketing and managers 
should identify those threats that are real and that deserve an appropriate response (Klemz 
and Gruca, 2003). In the multi-billion-dollar airline industry, for example, 15% to 20% of 
threats turn into an actual entry (Gayle and Wu, 2013; Parise 2018), a sizeable proportion 
that speaks well to the managerial implications of identifying the markets under a real 
threat of entry. In line with that promise – that threat type identification may improve an 
incumbent’s performance by enhancing its resource allocation efficacy – prior research 
(Eliashberg et al. 1996) recommended to “study how effectively managers distinguish 
between bluffs and truthful signals” (p. 31). Surprisingly, however, and despite a long-
lasting call to close this gap (Chen and Miller 2012; Eliashberg et al. 1996) and the 




of our knowledge, there is no empirical study that we are aware of on the drivers of real 
threat vs. bluff.  
In this paper, we take a step at addressing this gap in the marketing strategy 
literature by empirically investigating the characteristics of a real vs. bluff threat. More 
specifically, we estimate the probability of a real vs. a bluff as a function of (i) market 
characteristics, (ii) the characteristics of both the potential entrant and the incumbents, and 
(iii) the market network structure of both firms. According to the awareness-motivation-
capability framework (Chen et al. 2007), we argue that threats are more likely to be real 
when the potential entrant has the motivation to enter a market as well as the capability of 
doing so. This is challenging, however, because real threats vs. bluffs are not entirely 
observed — that is, there are missing values in the dependent variable. To overcome this 
challenge, we propose to employ a multiple imputation chained equation (MICE) method 
that makes use of two fundamental pieces of information: observed market entries and 
incumbents’ marketing reactions (i.e., price-cuts). This method can simultaneously impute 
the missing values for the threat type and estimate the effects of the variables of interest on 
the likelihood of the threat being a real one. 
Market entry threats posed by low-cost firms are a recent reality in many industries, 
and a well-known phenomenon in the airline industry for quite some years now (Ethiraj 
and Zhou 2019; Goolsbee and Syverson 2008), thus offering researchers an ample time 
window to study the impact of low-cost market entries and threats. We test our hypotheses 
empirically on an extensive, multi-market dataset from the US airline industry. This 
industry is particularly well suited for our purposes because threats of entry are frequent 




well established (Claussen, Essling and Peukert 2018; Ethiraj and Zhou 2019; Goolsbee 
and Syverson 2008; Prince and Simon 2014).  
For managers of incumbent firms, our findings may help to implement effective 
preemptive strategies when facing entry threats by potential entrants. In particular, our 
study adds to our understanding of resource allocation – and its management in a 
competitive environment. From an academic point of view, since not all threats are actual 
threats to incumbents in a market (Gayle and Wu 2013), we contribute to prior literature 
on market entry threat (Aydemir 2012; Ethiraj and Zhou 2019; Goetz and Shapiro 2012; 
Goolsbee and Syverson 2008; Prince and Simon 2014) by exploring the factors that can 
explain the seriousness level of entry threats posed by potential entrants. Moreover, we 
consider PE’s motivation and capability as drivers of its market entry decision, which 
typically have not been studied jointly in the previous literature.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the related theoretical 
background. Second, we develop a conceptual framework linking a threat type to the 
resources and capabilities of a potential entrant and of incumbents and derive predictions 
based on this framework. Third, we discuss our empirical modeling and estimation 
strategies and describe our airline industry data and the operationalization of the different 
variables used. Finally, we present the results and discuss their implications as well as the 
limitations of our study and future research opportunities. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The entry of new firms into an existing market increases competition, hurts incumbents’ 
market shares, and erodes their profits (Geroski, 1995). Given the potentially disruptive 




quickly and forcefully to threats (Goetz and Shapiro 2012; Goolsbee and Syverson 2008; 
Parise 2018; Seamans 2013) to deter entry (Cookson 2017; Dafny 2005; Ellison and 
Ellison, 2011; Ethiraj and Zhou 2019). However, not all threats posed by these potential 
entrants are the same, and only serious threats should make incumbents respond and justify 
the use of price- and/or capacity-driven competitive resources (Ethiraj and Zhou 2019; 
Gayle and Wu 2013; Wang et al. 2016). This is easier said than done, since incumbents 
need to first and foremost identify the type of threat they are facing, i.e. whether it’s a 
serious or credible one or simply a bluff. 
Incumbents are not always successful drawing a distinction between a serious or 
real threat and a bluff (Karaer and Erhun 2015). Given that competitive responses (e.g., 
price reduction, capacity expansion) are often costly to incumbents (Heil and Robertson, 
1991), resource misallocation in response to threats has a detrimental impact on the 
incumbents’ performance and ability to defend their markets. Surprisingly, prior literature 
left unexplored how an incumbent can more accurately draw a distinction between serious 
threats and bluffs. Relying on the awareness-motivation and capability (AMC) framework 
(Chen 1996; Chen et al. 2007), we explore the firm and market level correlates of a real vs. 
a bluff threat.  
Awareness, Motivation, and Capability Perspective 
According to the AMC framework (Chen 1996; Chen et al. 2007), three behavioral drivers 
influence a PE’s decision to enter a market: awareness, motivation, and capability. Thus, a 
PE needs to not only be aware of the markets it wishes to enter, but also be motivated to 
and capable of doing so. That is, awareness may make a PE threaten a market, but it is 




motivation and/or capability turn a threat into a mere bluff. In the context of the US airline 
industry, we assume all market players are aware of all existing markets, which are the 
officially authorized routes linking national airports (this is the common definition of a 
market in the industry and in past literature; see e.g., Ethiraj and Zhou 2019; Prince and 
Simon 2014) 
Since a rival’s move is best seen through the rival’s eye (Tsai et al. 2011), an 
incumbent observing a threatening move from a PE firm should concentrate on figuring 
out whether the PE really is motivated and/or is capable of actually entering the market. 
Accordingly, we discuss in detail next the underpinnings of a PE’s motivation and ability 
to attack and enter a new market.  
Motivation to Attack and Enter a New Market 
First and foremost, a PE’s perception of market attractiveness (e.g., market demand, 
growth, competitive intensity, etc.) influences its motivation to enter a market and the PE 
is more likely to attack markets that are highly attractive (Dixit and Chintagunta 2007). But 
although market attractiveness is the crucial motivational factor that influences entry 
decision, not all attractive markets are worth attacking. A PE also evaluates the risk 
associated with the market entry (Clark and Montgomery 1998), regardless of how 
attractive the market is. Expected attractiveness is not only a function of market demand 
and a market growth rate but is also a function of how easily the PE can capture the 
expected demand. Specifically, markets where incumbents have high resource 
redeployment capabilities will be riskier to attack because capable incumbents can easily 
and swiftly redeploy their resources to defend the market, thereby reducing the chance of 




resources would definitely influence PE’s motivation to entry. Moreover, a market’s 
importance to the incumbent is an important signal of a market’s attractiveness to the PE: 
as the importance of the market increases to the incumbents, they are more likely to defend 
the market at the time of rival’s entry and make the entry a riskier move for the PE. Thus, 
route importance may also influence PE’s motivation. Given all the above, we hypothesize 
that:  
H1a: The higher the market attractiveness, the more likely that the posed threat by 
the PE is a serious one. 
 
H1b: The higher the incumbents’ available resources (capabilities) in the market, the 
less likely that the posed threat by the PE is a serious one. 
 
Firms often compete against each other in many markets simultaneously. This multimarket 
competition (MMC) influences the competitive behavior of firms (Baum and Korn 1996; 
Gimeno 1999; Jayachandran, Gimeno, and Varadarajan 1999), in the sense that the higher 
the number of markets where the PE and the incumbents compete, the softer the intensity 
of their competitive activities (Baum and Korn 1999; Prince and Simon 2009). An 
incumbent is thus less likely to defend its markets at the time of entry (Ethiraj and Zhou 
2019) if it competes with the PE in several markets already. Therefore, the PE’s hesitation 
to attack the market would be lower. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following 
moderating effect of MMC: 
H2: The MMC between PE and incumbents weakens the negative correlation 
between incumbents’ capabilities and the likelihood that the posed threat by the PE 
is a serious one.  
 
Ability to Attack and Enter a New Market 
While having motivation is a necessary condition for market entry, it is not a sufficient 




likely to enter a new market no matter how attractive the market is. A PE’s ability to attack 
highly depends on its resources, both core and complementary (Helfat and Lieberman 
2002). Core resources include financial or physical assets, technological knowledge and 
knowledge of customer needs and complementary resources include customer service, 
distribution and logistics, and marketing and sales. We predict that the higher the PE’s 
ability the more its threatening moves should be regarded as signals of real threats, rather 
than the bluff by market incumbents. More formally, we propose that:  
H3: The higher the potential entrant’s (PE’s) resources and capabilities, the more 
likely that its posed threats are serious ones. 
 
The conceptual framework, depicted in Figure 2.1, suggests that not only incumbents’ but 
also potential entrants’ resources and capabilities, as well as marketplace characteristics, 
determine the nature of the posed threats by the PE. Implicitly, we assume incumbents can 
reduce the uncertainty regarding whether a competitive move is either a real threat or a 
bluff  by ‘reading potential entrants’ faces,’ i.e., by taking into consideration PEs actions 
and characteristics.20 Next, we test the hypotheses discussed above on a large scale, 
longitudinal dataset on threatening moves by low-cost PEs in the airline industry.  
DATA, INDUSTRY CONTEXT, AND THREAT CLASSIFICATION 
The Airline industry is particularly well suited for our purposes because each one of the 
thousands of routes between any two airports is considered a unique market (Claussen, 
Essling and Peukert 2018; Dixit and Chintagunta 2007; Ethiraj and Zhou 2019; Prince and 
Simon 2014), where entries and entry threats are frequent and easily observed, and the 
                                                 
20 From an econometrician’s point of view our uncertainty regarding the identification of a real threat vs. a 
bluff is lower than that of incumbent firms at the time they face their PEs’ actual moves. In fact, by observing 
past competitive moves of incumbents and their PEs and making a few assumptions, we can, not without 




identification of the potential entrants and existing incumbents is well established (Ethiraj 
and Zhou 2019). 
In this research, we explore threats posed by low-cost carriers (LCC), which are 
frequent in this industry – and virtually all airlines will at some point face low-cost 
competitors (Ethiraj and Zhou 2019; Gerardi and Shapiro 2009; Parise 2018).21 Focusing 
on threats posed by LCCs – as opposed to major carriers – is important because, over the 
past three decades, low-cost carriers have significantly increased their domestic market 
share and have entered major airlines’ markets (Ethiraj and Zhou 2019). Furthermore, the 
entry of a low-cost carrier has a much larger impact on incumbents’ profit margins than 
the entry of a major carrier (Parise 2018). Also, unlike major airlines that have alliances 
and code sharing with each other, low-cost airlines usually avoid such collaborations, 
further making their moves be taken as threatening from a competitive point of view (Goetz 
and Shapiro, 2012). Finally, major airlines take not only route- but also the entire network-
profitability into account when deciding to get into or stay out of a particular route, and the 
focus on LCCs avoids this type of confounds.  
Our data cover market-level information, carriers’ characteristics, and firms’ 
activities, from the first quarter of 1997 through the fourth quarter of 2015. Five low-cost 
carriers, AirTran, Southwest, JetBlue, Frontier, and Spirit have remained significant 
players in the U.S. airline industry throughout that period.  
Threat definition. Before discussing our dependent variable, i.e., whether a threat 
is a serious one or a bluff, we first define a threat per se. To determine whether a market 
                                                 
21 When analyzing firms’ decisions to enter a market, sunk costs may be a confound factor. Since it is typically 
unavailable to researchers, it would be difficult to empirically control for it (Dixit 1989; Elfenbein and Knott 
2015; O’Brien and Folta 2009). In the airline industry, however, sunk costs are negligible (see also Aghaie, 




or route i is under a threat of entry by a potential entrant, we rely on Goolsbee and Syverson 
(2008) definition of “entry threat.” In a given route, if a low-cost carrier is operating flights 
out of both endpoint airports of that particular route but is not actually operating a nonstop 
flight on that route, the route is under the threat of entry by that LCC. As an example, 
consider that an incumbent is serving the route between Miami (MIA) and Washington 
(IAD) at T=0. Imagine that an LCC starts flying out of Miami (MIA) to Denver (Den) at 
T=1. Although the LCC got close to the MIA-IAD route, it still does not threaten that 
market. Imagine further that the LCC enters the Washington Dulles International Airport 
(IAD) and starts operating between IAD and other airports (e.g., Atlanta (ATL)), just not 
the IAD-MIA route. According to Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), once an LCC operates 
out of both airports of one route – in this example, MIA first and then IAD – the probability 
that the LCC soon starts serving the route itself increases dramatically. In other words, 
once the LCC establishes its presence at the second airport of the market, it poses an entry 
threat to the incumbents on that market, i.e., the market is under threat by the LCC (Please 
see Figures 2.1 a-c).  
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) argue that when a low-cost airline has gates, 
counters, ground crew and maintenance facilities established at both airports of a particular 
route, it would be easier to begin nonstop service on the route between two airports. We 
should highlight that the threat-of-entry proxy is only appropriate for LCCs due to the way 
in which these airlines are willing to fly routes between two non-hub airports. Parise (2018) 
showed that once the low-cost potential entrant establishes its presence at the second 




For traditional hub-and-spoke major airlines22, however, the mere presence of operations 
in two airports is not a meaningful predictor of future nonstop service between the 
endpoints, since hub considerations are far more critical for such carriers (Aydemir, 2012; 
Goetz and Shapiro, 2012). 
Threat type classification. Our main goal is to understand how market-specific 
factors, together with incumbents’ and a PE’s characteristics, affect the likelihood that 
incumbent firms are faced with a serious threat vs. a bluff. To classify threats into one of 
the two types of the threat we use two fundamental pieces of information: incumbents’ 
observed marketing reactions to the threat (if any) and the PE’s entry (if any). Imagine a 
potential entrant’s action brings it closer to an incumbent’s market. Imagine further that an 
incumbent does not react to this action. In that case, if, despite the incumbent’s apathetic 
approach to the PE’s threat, the PE does not enter the market anytime soon, the move was 
likely to be a bluff (and maybe it has been a bluff since then) – and the incumbent was right 
doing nothing. But if the PE soon enters the market, the move was a real threat back then 
– and maybe the incumbent should have done something about it. Now imagine an 
incumbent does react. If the PE soon enters the market, the move was a real threat – and 
one the incumbent could not avoid despite trying. The real challenge is how to classify 
cases where the incumbent reacts to the threat of entry and we do not observe a subsequent 
entry anytime soon. It is hard to tell what type of move that was back then – it could be 
that either the incumbent’s reaction deterred the PE’s entry, or the opponent was bluffing 
                                                 
22 Hub and spoke’ systems connect origins and destinations through hubs. For example, passengers from one 
city with different destinations are carried together on a flight to a hub (this flight or route is called ‘spoke’). 
Then, they are combined with passengers arriving from other cities into a hub and finally this passenger pool 
will be regrouped onto separate flights (spokes) to different destinations. High traffic volume at hubs allows 





all along, i.e. the PE was, ‘in reality’, not planning to enter the market. In sum, we can 
derive the ‘data’ for our dependent variable ex-post in all possible cases, but one (Table 
2.1 a and b). We propose to handle this one case as a missing data problem.  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Having a binary dependent variable would suggest a discrete choice model such as probit 
or logit. However, to be able to include several time- and firm-fixed effects into our model, 
prior studies (Claussen, Essling, and Peukert 2018; Hellevik, 2009) suggest applying a 
linear probability model (LPM). Moreover, compared to the non-linear models, LPM 
allows researchers to easily provide a more meaningful interpretation of the main effects 
and the interaction terms. We ran both linear and logistic models. Since the sign and 
significance of the coefficients of interest, and therefore our overall results, are virtually 
the same, we only discuss the LPM results (all results are available upon request).  
Model 
We model the likelihood π that a PE’s threat is a serious one (hence 1- π is the likelihood 
that the threatening move is a bluff) as a function of the potential entrant’s motivation and 
capability of market entry, incumbents’ characteristics, and market-specific factors. 
Specifically, π(real) in route i is a function of market characteristics (e.g., demand, growth 
rate, competitive intensity) and the PE’s and incumbents’ resources and capabilities. Thus, 
we develop a linear regression model as follows: 
π(reali)= β0 + β1IncR&Ci + β2MarketGrowthi + β3MarketDemandi + β4Pricei +β5Delayi + 




β12MMCi + β13NInci + β14Leisurei + β15Hubi + β16LoadFactori + β17MMCi×PE-R&Ci + β18-
21PEi + β22-37Yearj + β38-47INCi                                                                                       (2.1)                                                                                        
All measurements are averages over eight pre-threat quarters. The right-hand side 
independent variables are operationalized as described below.  
PE’s Motivation to Enter.  
Incumbent’s Resources & Capabilities (R&Cs). Airport level investments can be a good 
proxy for route-level investments (Prince and Simon 2014). For instance, carriers can hire 
more employees to speed up several processes at the airport such as loading and unloading 
baggage, check-in, etc. Moreover, airlines can have an additional airplane at an airport or 
have a ready supply of mechanics available to avoid any issue resulting from unexpected 
mechanical failures. More importantly, airlines can acquire more gates and increase the 
number of counters at airports. Moreover, since available R&Cs at the airport (e.g., number 
of aircraft, counters, gates, employees) would be easily redeployed to any route that 
originates from the airport, airport level resources would be highly correlated with the route 
level R&Cs. Thus, we use the average of the incumbent’s R&Cs at the endpoint cities as a 
proxy for the incumbent’s available R&Cs at each route. For instance, for the route O-D, 
the incumbent’s R&C would be (OR&C + DR&C)/2. For routes with more than one 
incumbent, we use market share weighted averages to calculate route level R&Cs. The use 
of weights based on market shares ensures that the relative competitive strength (leader vs. 
followers) of incumbents in a market, and their impact on potential entrant’s decision, 
remains23. 
                                                 
23 The use of market-share weighted averages assumes the potential entrant looks at the resources of a 




Airport level R&Cs measurement. Since all of these investments plus airline’s 
technical and managerial capabilities would be reflected in the airline’s flight schedules, 
frequency, and on-time performance, we use flight frequency and schedule as a proxy for 
the incumbent’s resource and capabilities at the airport.24 Accordingly, we develop six 
measures to capture different aspects of airport level R&Cs. The first of the incumbents’ 
R&Cs measure at airport i, is the maximum number of non-stop flights per quarter 
(MaxQtri) that land or depart the airport during the pre-threat stage. As a second measure, 
we generate MaxDayi which is the maximum number of non-stop flights (inbound or 
outbound) per day across the pre-threat period and, as a third measure, we generate 
MaxHouri which is the maximum number of non-stop flights per hour across the pre-threat 
period. Carriers also compete with each other to offer consumers more convenient access 
to their service by increasing the frequency of flight departures in peak times. Prior 
literature defines a peak period as a 7-10am or 3-7pm on weekdays (see Oliveira and Huse 
2009; Sengupta and Wiggins 2014). Peak time-frequency affects passengers’ choice of the 
airline because travelers are both price- and time-sensitive (Shaw 2007). Accordingly, the 
other three measures for airlines’ airport R&Cs, are MaxPeakDayi, MaxPeakQtri, and 
MaxPeakHouri which are the maximum number of non-stop peak time flights (inbound or 
outbound) per day, per quarter, and per hour, respectively. Since these six measures are 
highly correlated and capture different aspects of firms’ R&Cs, we compute incumbents’ 
R&Cs at each airport as the principal component score of the above six indices. Factor 
                                                 
possess by say an undisputed market leader will show more strongly than those with negligible market shares. 
In such cases, a potential entrant is likely to pay more attention to ‘who possesses what’. 
24 Incumbent’s resource and capability would also influence its On-Time performance. However, since a big 
portion of delays might be due to the other airport-level factors that are out of the airline’s control, we decided 




analysis confirms that a single factor accounts for 99% of the six scores’ combined 
variance. The composite variable is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1.  
Market importance to the incumbent. In network industries such as the airline 
industry, in which firms operate and interact with each other in several interconnected 
markets, the importance of a market for a given firm is related to the firm’s market network 
structure. This is because what happens in one market is not entirely independent from all 
other markets, and thus the perceived importance of each market should be evaluated not 
only by its stand-alone appeal but also by its connection with other markets. In the airline 
industry, the different (geographical) markets are naturally connected by the very nature of 
routes linking any two airports, and some routes are more central (important) than others. 
We measure incumbents’ route importance or route centrality within their networks, 
IncNetwork using a measure developed by Dunn (2008): for each route, the network 
importance measure is determined by the number of non-stop markets that originate from 
the two endpoints (excluding the non-stop route to the city being considered) divided by 
its network size. For instance, if, in a route between city “O” and city “D”, an LCC has five 
non-stop routes out of “O” and six non-stop routes out of “D”, and it serves 100 routes 
within its network, then the network centrality (importance) of route O-D is [(5+6)-2] / 100 
= .09.  
Market demand and growth rate: we measure route demand as a geometric mean 
of the population in the endpoint cities in the pre-threat period (Dixit and Chintagunta’s 
2007). This variable is important because PEs usually focus on serving routes with high 




attractiveness of the market. And the market growth is the average quarterly growth rate 
across the pre-threat period.  
Pre-threat environment: we focus on two fundamental aspects of the competitive 
environment before threats unfold (of any competitive environment for that matter): market 
price characteristics and service quality levels. To capture price characteristics (Pricei), we 
first calculated the incumbents’ weighted average of prices, price variances and median 
prices over eight pre-threat quarters, where incumbents’ market-shares serve as weights. 
Then, we performed principal component analysis on these three measures and generated 
a univariate score to measure price characteristic. Since higher scores indicate that the 
incumbents charge high prices with high variances, the PE’s low-cost proposition would 
be a particularly compelling one among price-sensitive consumers that higher priced 
mainstream carriers are not serving effectively. As a result, the market with higher price 
score is a good target for the PE.  
One of the main indicators of service quality in the airline industry is the percentage 
of flights that arrive on-time (Grewal, Chandrashekaran, and Citrin 2010), which is 
available at route-level (see Prince and Simon 2014). Prior literature proposed three 
different definitions for the delayed flight; (1) if the flight arrives at least 1 minute late, (2) 
if it arrives at least 15 minutes late, and (3) if it arrives at least 30 minutes late. Therefore, 
to develop a measure for OTPi, we first calculated the market-share weighted average of 
the percentage of flights that are late using these three thresholds (Prince and Simon 2014). 
Then again, we performed principal component analysis on these three measures and 
generated a univariate score to measure the service quality. The expected sign of this 




markets with the inferior service quality. On the other hand, since high market level delay 
might prevent the PE from keeping the turnaround time as low as possible, the PE may not 
be interested in attacking those targets. 
Multi-market competition (MMC). Airlines often compete against each other in 
many markets simultaneously, which influences competitive behavior (Baum and Korn 
1999; Gimeno 1999), thus we define a multimarket variable (MMC), as follows. For PE , 
in route i, we count all common routes with incumbents over all routes in quarter j that 
threat starts and then divide the PE’s total contact by (n - 1), where n is the number of 
incumbents in route i. Finally, we standardized the average count by the number of markets 
served by the potential entrants in quarter j (for a review of MMC operationalizations, see 
Baum and Korn 1996).  
PE’s Ability to Enter 
PE’s Resources & Capabilities (R&Cs). Similar to what we did for incumbents, we 
measured a PE’s MaxQtri, MaxDayi, MaxHouri MaxPeakDayi, MaxPeakQtri and 
MaxPeakHouri at each airport and then generated a principal component score of these six 
indices as a measure of that PE’s R&C’s at each endpoint city. Finally, the PE’s R&C 
would be (OR&C + DR&C)/2. 
PE’s size. Well-established PEs with a large national network may have higher 
resources and capabilities and are probably more successful than smaller PEs in pursuing 
their growth strategies. For example, bigger PEs are stronger financially (Claussen, 
Essling, and Peukert, 2018), have more experiences and infrastructures and therefore may 
have more staying power in, say, price wars (Dixit and Chintagunta 2007). Furthermore, 




logistical advantages of larger networks (Ito and Lee 2003). Thus, larger PEs would be 
more likely to pose a serious threat than smaller ones would. In our model, we use the 
natural log of the total number of passengers that are carried by the PE as a measure of the 
PE’s size (Dixit and Chintagunta 2007). 
Fuel cost. Low-cost airlines are by nature more vulnerable to fluctuations in 
production costs than legacy airlines. Since fuel cost is one of the most important expenses 
for airlines in general – it accounts for almost 30% of operating costs – its fluctuations are 
likely to seriously limit LCCs capabilities to growth. For instance, in 2008 a 7% increase 
in fuel price has been estimated to decrease an airline’s net profit by almost 2%. During 
the time of our study, the fuel price had a large variation (±30% to ±80% year-over-year)25 
and because the low-cost airline is more vulnerable to these variations, we believe that the 
higher fuel prices can also reduce PE’s motivation to enter a market. 
Control variables 
A wide array of factors may also influence the type of posed threat that should be controlled 
for. We use control variables related to firms as well as market level controls. 
Competitive intensity and Route distance. NInci is the total number of incumbents 
in route i, and Distancei the distance between two endpoint airports for each route. Short 
haul routes are more attractive than long ones for LCCs because their cost structure requires 
a quick turnover (Berry and Jia 2010). This means LCCs have a higher incentive to target 
                                                 
25 See https://www.iata.org/pressroom/facts_figures/fact_sheets/Documents/fact-sheet-fuel.pdf for an 
estimate of fuel price’s weight on operating costs. The estimated impact of fuel price on profits can be found 
at https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/07/29/american-airlines-profit-surges-on-fuel-cost-
savings-unit-revenue-to-remain-weak-until-mid-2016/#14cf6fec6d4d. In our data, the average fuel price was 




short-haul routes. Therefore, in each route, we control for the distance between origin and 
destination airports, in miles. 
Load factor. The passenger load factor measures the capacity utilization of airlines 
and somehow indicates how efficiently the airline is performing. We expect that potential 
entrants are less likely to target routes in which incumbents have high load factors. We 
operationalize a load factor as the percentage of available seating capacity that is filled with 
passengers. 
Market type. Since leisure travel demand is more price sensitive, LCCs target 
markets with a high percentage of leisure passengers (Bendinelli et al. 2016). We identified 
leisure routes using Gerardi and Shapiro’s (2009) list of leisure destinations in the US. If 
one of the route endpoints is among these leisure cities, we coded the route as a ‘leisure 
route.’ Therefore, the leisure variable equals one for the leisure route and zero otherwise. 
Firm, year and market fixed effects. Finally, we include a set of yearly dummies 
Yearj to capture unobserved time-varying macroeconomic factors such as shifts in demand 
and costs of production, and other unobserved time factors (Greenfield 2014; Mayer and 
Sinai 2003), and a set of potential entrants, PEi and incumbent dummies, INCi, to capture 
potential unobserved incumbent- and potential entrant-specific factors. Any inherent 
differences between PEs that might influence the type of threat they impose are therefore 
captured by these fixed effects. See Table 2.2 for a summary of descriptive statistics of all 
variables and their correlation matrix. 
Estimation  
As mentioned before, we handle the cases where the incumbent reacts to the threat of entry 




that either the incumbent’s reaction deterred the PE’s entry, or the opponent was bluffing 
all along.  
We used three different strategies to handle the missing observations and estimated 
different models. Initially, we assume that observations are missing completely at random 
(MCAR). Second, we mean imputed the missing IVs observations and only dropped the 
missing DV observations. Finally, we estimated a multiple imputation chain equations 
(MICE) model that imputes missing observations. We explain the MICE model in more 
detail, next. 
MICE – multiple imputation chain equations 
Traditional techniques that either drop missing observations and run the analysis using a 
complete dataset or replace missing values with the mean or mode, are now considered 
inadequate – and methodologies such as multiple imputation chain equations (MICE) have 
been introduced as principled approaches to analyze incomplete data. Its main objective is 
not to precisely predict the missing observations but to handle missing data in such a way 
that result in a valid statistical inference. MI estimation (1) can be more efficient than 
commonly-used listwise deletion (complete-cases analysis) and can correct for potential 
bias; (2) it is more flexible than fully-parametric methods, e.g. maximum likelihood, purely 
Bayesian analysis; and (3) since it accounts for missing-data uncertainty, it does not 
underestimate the variance of estimates like single imputation methods. In brief, the model 
works as follows. 
The MICE model specifies a posterior density function for the missing values using 
a set of predictor variables. Furthermore, it assumes that given the predictor variables used 




(MAR).26 In other words, after controlling for all the variables, missingness depends only 
on the observed values (Azur et al. 2011). To mitigate the uncertainty associated with the 
value of missing observations, the MI method makes several draws of the missing data 
from their posterior predictive distribution and replaces missing values with multiple sets 
of values to complete the data. Then, each complete dataset will be analyzed independently 
in order to estimate the parameters of interests. Finally, parameters obtained from the m 
datasets are averaged to give a single estimate with a corresponding standard error (if there 
is little (much) information in the observed data to predict the missing values the 
imputation results will be associated with large (small) standard errors)  
We estimate the MICE model parameters in Stata using the command  mi estimate. We use 
route-level clustered standard errors that make our hypotheses testing more conservative 
and enable us to control for unobserved route-specific factors (Eilert et al. 2017; Mccann 
and Vroom 2010). Also, we follow prior studies that suggest the imputation model should 
always include all variables: the dependent variable as well as any other independent, 
control and auxiliary variables that may provide information about the probability of 
missingness, or about the true value of the missing data and that help reducing bias and 
make the MAR assumption more plausible (Azur et al. 2011 and Collins et al. 2001). 
Specifically, we include in the model variables that are substantively important and are a 
proxy of market attractiveness, which might be related with the propensity for incumbents 
to react – and influence the number of missing values (for more discussion please see 
Appendix E).  
                                                 





The results are presented in Table 2.3. When dropping all missing observations we estimate 
our model using only 1764 remaining data points (Table 2.3, column - a),27 and when mean 
imputing the missing IVs observations and dropping only the missing DV observations the 
model is estimated using 3692 data points (Table 2.3, column - b). As already explained, 
the MICE model imputes all missing observations (Table 2.3, column - c). The sign and 
significance of the coefficient of interests are pretty consistent across models b and c 
(models that include imputed observations). However, the results of model a (with no 
imputed values) is slightly different from models with the imputed observations. We focus 
on the results of the MICE model for the following reasons.  
The MICE results are very much comparable to those from the series of 'hand-
imputed' models, which suggests MICE is not an obscure method that could lead to 
dramatically different conclusions. Using a formal method to handle missing values in the 
DV, as MICE does, however, is advisable as some differences may arise from an 
econometrically sound approach to the missing values problem. And in fact, in our case, 
the MICE model estimates the PE’s size effect to be positive and significant, while the 
'hand-imputed' models find no effect for this variable. The results from the MICE method 
are in line with a vast literature on strategy supporting the effect of firms’ size (Claussen, 
Essling, and Peukert 2018).  
MICE Estimation (LPM). Table 2.4 presents the results of our MICE model that 
estimates how PE’s motivation and capability would influence the seriousness level of the 
                                                 
27 Along with 572 missing observations in DV, we also have missing observations in IVs. PE-Size has 1549 
missing observations and PE-Resources has 1499 missing values. Thus, the remaining number of 




threats posed by the PEs. 28 Notice that the model is parameterized in such a way that a 
positive coefficient in the LMP regression implies a positive effect on the likelihood of 
being a real threat. To measure the model fit, we calculate the overall accuracy of the 
model. The accuracy is 81% which means that the model gives an accurate prediction 81% 
of the time. Thus, our model improves classification accuracy by 31% compared to the 
random assignment procedure with 50% accuracy.29 We start by describing the results 
regarding the effects of control variables which are measured at route-, challenger- and 
network-levels.  
Control variables. As illustrated in Table 2.4, all control variables but one (whether 
there is an incumbent’s hub in one of the two endpoint cities; p > .10) are highly significant 
explaining the threat type likelihood. Market-level characteristics, whether the market is 
leisure market (βLeisure = 0.125, p < .01), the distances traveled (βDistance = -0.017, p < .01 & 
βDistanceSQ = -0.0007, p < .01  ) and degree of multimarket contact (βMMC = 0.85, p < .01), 
significantly influence the likelihood that the posed threat by the PEs are real. These effects 
could be expected from an economic point of view. For instance, the cost efficiency of 
low-cost PEs compared to that of mainstream incumbents shows up more strongly on 
shorter travel distances as longer routes become too costly to serve (Joskow, Werden, and 
Johnson 1994). As a last control at the route level, we observe a negative association 
between load factor (βLoad factor = -0.15, p < .01) and the probability of being a real threat. 
This indicates that routes, where incumbents are operating efficiently, are less likely to be 
                                                 
28 To estimate the final model, we have used LPM. We also implemented a logistic regression and show that 
the sign and significance of coefficients of interest, and therefore our overall results, remain unaffected. The 






PE’s targets. We also found that PEs are more likely to attack markets with a higher number 
of incumbents (βNInc = 0.274, p < .01). Prior studies indicate that in the oligopolistic markets 
free-rider problem is an important factor that may cause incumbent firms to underinvest in 
deterrence strategies (Persson 2004; Waldman 1991). In this situation, the potential entrant 
expects to encounter low or limited incumbents’ responses, thereby is more likely to attack 
the market. 
Results for the Hypotheses 
PE’s Motivation to Entry. The results from the LPM revealed that the higher the PE’s 
motivation to enter a market, it is more likely that the posed threat is a serious one. As we 
discussed earlier, PE’s motivation can be reflected in market attractiveness (e.g., market 
growth rate, market demand, pre-threat environment) and also, incumbent’s R&Cs. Table 
2.4 illustrates that: as the incumbent’s R&Cs increases, the probability of being a real threat 
decrease (βInc-resource = -.023, p < .01), which clearly indicates that when the incumbent is 
capable of defending its market, the entry would be much riskier and thus the market is not 
a good target for the PE. Moreover, PEs are less interested in those markets that are 
important to the incumbents (βMarket-Importance = -1.5, p < .01) and will pose less serious 
threats to those markets. Both market demand and market growth rate are positively 
correlated with the likelihood of being a real threat (βDemand = 0.0001, p < .05 & βGrowthRate 
= 0.41, p < .01). Since the market is financially attractive, the PE has a higher incentive to 
attack the market, thus the posed threat would be more serious. As expected, the markets 
with a higher price are more likely to be a target for the PEs (βPrice = 0.046, p < .01) thus 




delay is not significant indicating that two mechanisms discussed earlier might cancel each 
other out, making the net impact zero.  
As predicted by H2, multi-market contact between the incumbents and PE reduces 
the negative impact of incumbents’ R&Cs on the likelihood of being a real threat (βInc-
resource×MMC = 0.21, p < .01). As the number of markets where the PE and the incumbents 
compete with each other increases, incumbents are less likely to launch tough competitive 
reactions in response to the entry, thus market entry for the PE would be less risky. 
PE’s Capability of Entry. As predicted by H3 and illustrated in Table 2.4, the 
probability of being a serious threat is also significantly affected by PE’s available 
resources and macroeconomic factors. Specifically, PEs with higher available resources at 
the under-threat market with a larger size are more likely to attack the market, thus, would 
pose a more serious threat of entry (βPe resource = 0.01, p < .01; βSize = 0.01, p < .01;). Finally, 
other than the market- and firm-level factors, macroeconomics factors also can influence 
the probability of a threat being real. For example, when the fuel prices are higher, PEs 
may slow down their network expansion, thus their posed threats are less likely to be real 
(βFuelPrice = -0.17, p < .01). In sum, our results lend support for all hypotheses (H1a & b, 
H2, H3).  
Robustness Checks 
Entry identification. To differentiate a real threat from a bluff, we relied on observed 
entries. In the initial analysis, we coded entry as 1 if the PE enters a market any time after 
it starts threatening the market. However, some entries may occur immediately after the 
threat being established and some may be materialized long after threat establishment with 




entry definition, as a robustness check, we coded entry as 1 if the PE enters the market (a) 
immediately after it starts threatening the market, (b) one quarter after threat, and (c) two, 
(d) three, (e) four, (f) five, and (g) six quarters after threat. The results suggest that our key 
findings are not driven by the definition of the entry (See Appendix A, Table A.2).  
Reaction identification. In our initial analysis, we define incumbents’ reaction as a 
10% price cut in response to the threat. To test the sensitivity of our results to this threshold, 
we re-estimate our model using two alternative cut-off points, 5% price cut, and 15% price 
cut. The results suggest that our key findings are not driven by the definition of reaction 
either (See Appendix A, Table A.3). 
Distribution of threat type. In our initial dataset (before imputation), almost 70% 
of the observed threats are bluff and 30% are real. MICE keeps the distribution of observed 
values when imputing the missing values. What if the final distribution of missing values 
does not follow the observed distribution? To explore this question, we have done several 
additional analyses. First, we assumed that all missing DV observations are real threats 
(coded as 1) and mean imputed the IVs missing observations, second, we assumed that all 
missing DV observations are bluff threats (coded as 0) and again mean imputed the IVs 
missing observations (See Appendix A, Table A.4). We also consider that 70% of missing 
DV values are bluff, then 50% is bluff, and finally 30% of missing DV values are bluff and 
randomly assign “real” and “bluff” to the missing DV observations, and mean imputed the 
missing IVs for each model (see Appendix A, Table A.5).30 All these different assumptions 
                                                 





lead to similar and consistent results, which suggest that our estimates do not depend much 
on distributional assumptions. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Contribution 
Since the threat of a new entrant is one of the five competitive forces that affect a firm’s 
performance (Porter 1979), it deserves ample research attention. The focus of our study is 
to assess the threat posed by the potential entrant. Since incumbents do not have unlimited 
resources to respond to every potential foe, threat type classification is one of the most 
crucial tasks in marketing strategy (Klemz and Gruca 2003). 
Several studies in economics and management have indeed explored how 
incumbent firms react to the threat of entry and whether these deterrence strategies are 
effective in dissuading a PE from stepping into their markets (Cookson 2017; Ethiraj and 
Zhou 2019; Frésard and Valta 2016; Homburg et al. 2013; Seamans 2013). These studies, 
however, implicitly assume that all threats are equal and can provoke an incumbent’s 
response. In this research, we explore the more realistic and common situation in which (1) 
an incumbent faces multiple threats posed by the potential entrants and (2) the nature of 
competitive threats is different. A key point that we make in this study is that even when 
potential entrants start threatening a market, the threat may not be a “competitive threat” 
to the incumbents in the market and in that case, they would be better off by not committing 
scarce resources to protect the market. As the number of potential entrants increases, the 
incumbents more often misidentify the most threatening entrant (Klemz and Gruca 2003; 
Yip 1982). Since incumbent does not have an unlimited budget to defend its market, a most 




to the competitive dynamic literature by empirically distinguishing real threats from the 
bluff and is among the first studies that examine the extent to which some entry threats are 
highly threatening (i.e., are credible or serious threats) while others are not (i.e., are bluff). 
Recent studies indicate that there is heterogeneity among incumbents with regards 
to market responses – with incumbents strategically increasing, decreasing or maintaining 
their prior investment levels in face of a threat of entry (Frésard and Valta 2016; see also 
Dafny 2005; Goolsbee and Syverson 2008; Ellison and Ellison 2011). Moreover, these 
studies suggest that incumbents’ decision to respond to a threat is a very difficult task, and 
one that needs to take into account various disparate factors such as whether the PE’s 
product/service is a strategic substitute or complement, whether investments signal 
incumbents are soft or tough defenders, and whether firms can feasibly deter entry or need 
to strategically accommodate, but is silent about what comes first – the type of threat to 
start with. The findings of our work can help incumbents identify the type of threat they 
are facing and help them decide whether to react and in what way. For instance, if 
incumbents perceive that the posed threats are a bluff, they probably should maintain the 
status quo investment levels – and do nothing about those threats.  
Limitations and Future Research 
While this study provides novel insights into the threat type classification, it also faces 
limitations that open the way to future research. The fact that the study is limited to the 
airline industry implies that the results may apply in another industry somewhat differently. 
However, using data from a single industry allows us to eliminate any confounding effects 
from extraneous industry-specific factors, thereby improving internal validity (Eilert et al. 




determine the extent to which our findings are generalizable to other industries and other 
contexts (i.e., product market entry). 
In this research we explore the antecedent of a real threat of entry in the context of 
the geographic market entry, however, firms can pose threats by introducing a new product 
within the same market. In this scenario, an innovator firm has a perfect new product, 
however, the firm knows that as soon as the new product hits the market, the other 
incumbents would react and develop a close substitute, thus the innovator firm will be 
involved in a head to head competition. Thus, in order to deceive the rivals, the innovative 
firm may introduce several inferior new products in order to mislead the incumbents hoping 
that the rivals would expend their limited resources on developing a close substitute to the 
inferior product (Hendricks and McAfee 2006). Once the incumbent being fooled, the 
entrant can introduce the superior the new product and win the market. So, another 
interesting avenue for the research would be distinguishing the innovator’s inferior (bluff) 
from the superior (real) new products. 
There is considerable evidence that firms use ‘decoy patents’ OR failure patents to 
mislead their rivals into the unprofitable research direction. For example, “in the petroleum 
industry, it is common practice to patent numerous inventions, one good one in a flood of 
bad inventions -- Langinier 2005 p. 522.“ Also, the pharmaceutical industry has appealing 
examples that firms try to pursue this patenting “deadends” strategy to send the competitors 
in wrong research directions (Hendricks and McAfee 2006; Langinier 2005). Although 
there are several examples from the real world that illustrate the decoy patenting strategy, 
a few studies have investigated patents as means to mislead competitors and more 




another promising avenue for the research would be exploring the characteristics of the 
real patent. 
Firms can also pose threats by entering a market on a small scale. In this situation, 
the entrant firm intentionally invests limited resources in multiple markets where it does 
not compete yet and establish a small position in those markets (Upson et al. 2012). By 
doing this micro-entry strategy, firms can develop a foothold in multiple markets by 
allocating a few resources. At a given point in time, the firm who owns a foothold can 
attack the market on a larger scale, may withdraw the foothold. Since an incumbent cannot 
react to all the micro-entries, a future study should be conducted to explore that 
characteristics of a serious foothold that might lead to the actual entry in the future. 
Furthermore, Clark and Montgomery (1998) indicate that an incumbent’s 
willingness and ability to defend its market enhance its reputation as a “credible defender,” 
and this reputation may deter potential entrants from attacking incumbents’ markets. Thus, 
another interesting opportunity for future research lies in empirically investigating to what 
extent an incumbent’s reputation is associated with the likelihood of the threat being real. 
Since in the airline industry, incumbents usually drop prices in response to the 
threat of entry, we used a level of price-cut as the main criterion to classified threats into 
real and bluff. However, in other industries, incumbents may react to the threat of entry by 
improving other aspects of marketing mix such as investing in their quality, advertising, 
etc. An operationalization of threat classification that uses other types of reaction (or a 
combination of them) would advance our current state of knowledge on differentiating a 




In this research, we apply a MICE method to impute the missing values. The main 
assumption of the MICE method is that after controlling for some factors, the missing data 
would become missing at random (MAR). However, future research could develop more 
sophisticated and advanced techniques to relax this assumption and be able to treat missing 
data as “Missing not at Random (MNAR).  
In conclusion, despite being limited to a single industry our research highlights an 
understudied area in marketing strategy by exploring the factors that can help firms to draw 
a distinction between a real market threat and bluff. To achieve this goal, we took the first 
step in that direction and hope our findings stimulate further interest in the study of the 
market threats phenomena as a complex process involving the interactions between 






















































− Market Characteristics 
− Incumbents’ Characteristics 
− Time and firm fixed effects 
Attractiveness: 
− Market Demand 
− Market Growth Rate 
− Incumbents Resource & Capabilities 
− Incumbent’s Market Network Structure 
− Pre-threat environment 
Likelihood of Serious Threat 
Capability: 
− PE’s Resource & Capabilities 
− PE’s Size 





































































ATL-IAD WN is a potential entrant  





























  Entry=0 Entry=1 Total 
Partially Unobserved 
Type of Threat 
Y=0 (Bluff) Nunobserved_bluff 0 Nbluff 
Y=1 (Real) Nunobserved_real Nobserved_real Nreal 
 Total Nunobserved Nobserved Ntotal 
 
Nunobserved_bluff (Nunobserved_real) refers to the unobserved number of the bluff (real) threats;  
Nobserved_real refers to the observed number of real threats 
  
Observed 
PE Entry after Observed PE Threat 
  Entry=1 Entry=0 
Observed Incumbents’ 
Move 
Reaction Real Unobserved 







TABLE 2.2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Threat Type 1.00                
2 Inc_resource -0.13 1.00               
3 Market Growth 0.06 0.00 1.00              
4 Market Demand 0.12 0.10 -0.05 1.00             
5 Pre-entry Price -0.15 0.21 0.05 -0.04 1.00            
6 Pre-entry OTP 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.26 0.10 1.00           
7 INCRouteImportance 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.17 0.21 0.14 1.00          
8 PE_resource 0.47 0.00 0.06 0.46 0.00 0.12 0.20 1.00         
9 PE_size 0.43 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.22 0.30 1.00        
10 FuelPrice -0.08 0.04 -0.22 -0.23 0.16 -0.18 -0.05 -0.10 0.16 1.00       
11 Market Distance 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.32 0.43 0.16 -0.09 0.20 -0.02 -0.07 1.00      
12 MMC -0.12 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.30 0.01 0.06 1.00     
13 Incumbent_num 0.34 -0.09 0.00 0.56 -0.24 0.08 0.11 0.55 0.08 -0.13 0.12 -0.06 1.00    
14 Leisure 0.14 -0.24 -0.07 0.05 -0.39 -0.08 -0.23 0.02 0.01 -0.09 0.01 -0.17 0.16 1.00   
15 HUB -0.18 0.33 0.01 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.34 -0.03 -0.11 0.10 -0.06 0.07 -0.11 -0.23 1.00  








*p < .10,  **p < .05,  ***p < .01 
Variance-Covariance is clustered at route level which is equivalent to route fixed effects.
TABLE 2.3: Results Across Different Imputation 
Techniques 
MODEL A  MODEL B MODEL C 
  Obs: 1764 Obs: 3692 Obs: 4245 
 Variables Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>t 
              
MOTIVATION 
Inc_resource -0.0272** 0.041 -0.0278*** 0.000 -0.02*** 0.00 
Market Growth 0.4875*** 0.000 0.4645*** 0.000 0.415*** 0 
Market Demand 0.0000 0.316 0.0001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.01 
Pre-entry Price 0.0086 0.599 0.0367*** 0.001 0.046*** 0 
Pre-entry OTP 0.0011 0.916 0.0113 0.120 0.006 0.45 
 INC_Route_Importance -1.1002
*** 0.000 -1.6260*** 0.000 -1.49*** 0 
              
CAPABILITY 
PE_Resource 0.0951*** 0.000 0.0731*** 0.000 0.098*** 0 
PE_Size -0.0370** 0.015 -0.0012 0.742 0.009*** 0 
FuelPrice -0.1401** 0.035 -0.1775*** 0.000 -0.17*** 0 
              
CONTROLS 
Market Distance 0.0147** 0.013 0.0233*** 0.000 0.017*** 0 
DistanceSQ -0.0005** 0.032 -0.0009*** 0.000 -
0.000*** 
0 
MMC 1.0929*** 0.000 0.6143*** 0.000 0.850*** 0 
Incumbent_num 0.1326** 0.015 0.3120*** 0.000 0.274*** 0 
Leisure 0.0469** 0.030 0.1135*** 0.000 0.124*** 0 
Hub -0.0341 0.196 -0.0053 0.762 0.001 0.95 
Load_factor -0.0950** 0.050 -0.1639*** 0.000 -0.14*** 0 
              







TABLE 2.4: Result with Multiple Imputation Chained Equations  
*p < .10,  **p < .05,  ***p < .01 
Variance-Covariance is clustered at route level which is equivalent to route fixed effects. 




















) INC_RESOURCE  -0.0229*** 0.0076 -3.04 0.003 -0.0378 -0.0081 
MARKET GROWTH RATE  0.4155*** 0.0912 4.56 0 0.2365 0.5945 
MARKET DEMAND  0.0001** 0 2.51 0.012 0 0.0001 
MARKET PRICE LEVEL  0.0465*** 0.0128 3.62 0 0.0212 0.0718 
ON TIME PERFORMANCE  0.0061 0.0082 0.75 0.454 -0.0099 0.0222 












PE_RESOURCE  0.098*** 0.0099 9.93 0 0.0785 0.1174 
PE_SIZE  0.0095*** 0.0024 3.98 0 0.0047 0.0143 

























MKTDISTANCE  0.0173*** 0.0042 4.14 0 0.0091 0.0255 
MKTDISTANCESQ  -0.0007*** 0.0002 -4.46 0 -0.001 -0.0004 
MMC  0.8508*** 0.1065 7.99 0 0.6418 1.0598 
INCUMBENT_NUM  0.274*** 0.0369 7.42 0 0.2013 0.3467 
LEISURE  0.1249*** 0.016 7.82 0 0.0935 0.1563 
HUB  0.001 0.0178 0.06 0.955 -0.034 0.036 
LOAD_FACTOR  -0.1493*** 0.0328 -4.55 0 -0.2138 -0.0848 
INC_RESOURCE×MMC  0.2153*** 0.0624 3.45 0.001 0.0927 0.3379 
 
PE-DUMMIES  Significant for Southwest and Spirit 
YEAR DUMMIES  Some significant 
INC-DUMMIES  Mostly significant 
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FIGURE A.1: Incumbents’ Marketing-Mix Tactics Before and After a Challenger’s Entry 
 
 






TABLE A.1:Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Notes: Bold: p < .05. TTE=Time to Exit, PE-PR = Pre-entry Price, PE-FR=Pre-entry frequency, PE-PK=Pre-entry peak frequency, PE-OTP=Pre-entry 
OTP, PE-PS=Pre-entry plane size, INC-PR= Incumbent post entry price-cut, INC-FR= Incumbent post entry frequency, INC-PK=Incumbent post entry 
peak frequency, INC-OTP=Incumbent post entry OTP, CH-PR=Challenger, F-PR = Fuel Price, CH-Size= Challenger Size, CH-IMP= Challenger route 
importance, IN-IMP= Incumbent route importance, NofINC= Number of Incumbents. 
a: Mean of time-to-exit is calculated among exit observations only. 
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31 We do not report year and firm fixed effects in this table; *p < .10,  **p < .05,  ***p < .01 
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Variables Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
MOTIVATION 
Inc_resource -0.013 0.002 -0.020 0.001 -0.027 0.000 -0.027 0.000 -0.024 0.002 -0.023 0.003 -0.026 0.001 
Market Growth 0.401 0.000 0.442 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.308 0.002 0.374 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.373 0.000 
Market Demand 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.240 0.000 0.828 0.000 0.739 0.000 0.694 0.000 0.394 
Pre-threat Price 0.073 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.059 0.000 
Pre-threat Delay 0.010 0.058 0.015 0.022 0.012 0.078 0.016 0.041 0.018 0.024 0.015 0.057 0.014 0.075 
 INC_Route_Importance -1.014 0.000 -0.988 0.000 -0.969 0.000 -1.088 0.000 -1.097 0.000 -1.103 0.000 -1.192 0.000 
                             
CAPABILITY 
PE_Resource 0.066 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.091 0.000 
PE_Size 0.000 0.915 0.003 0.169 0.004 0.033 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.061 0.004 0.024 0.005 0.025 
FuelPrice -0.105 0.000 -0.118 0.000 -0.131 0.000 -0.135 0.000 -0.149 0.000 -0.125 0.000 -0.125 0.000 
                             
CONTROLS 
Market Distance 0.001 0.617 0.008 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.014 0.000 
DistanceSQ 0.000 0.043 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
MMC 0.592 0.000 0.684 0.000 0.726 0.000 0.808 0.000 0.748 0.000 0.887 0.000 0.901 0.000 
Incumbent_num 0.449 0.000 0.445 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.391 0.000 0.390 0.000 0.366 0.000 
Leisure 0.051 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.082 0.000 
Hub 0.043 0.001 0.019 0.197 0.015 0.329 0.016 0.307 0.020 0.236 -0.001 0.960 0.005 0.787 
Load_factor -0.347 0.000 -0.290 0.000 -0.275 0.000 -0.283 0.000 -0.248 0.000 -0.251 0.000 -0.237 0.000 
                             
INTERACTION Inc Resource*MMC 0.146 0.000 0.294 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.291 0.000 
 
 





















  10% PRICE CUT 5% PRICE CUT 15% PRICE CUT 
  MISSING DV: 572 OBS MISSING DV: 849 OBS MISSING DV: 371 OBS 
 VARIABLES COEF. STD. 
ERR. 
P>T COEF. STD. 
ERR. 




INC_RESOURCE -0.0229 0.0076 0.003 -0.0206 0.0097 0.036 -0.0252 0.0066 0.0000 
MARKET GROWTH 0.4155 0.0912 0 0.3265 0.1069 0.003 0.4369 0.0922 0.0000 
MARKET DEMAND 0.0001 0 0.012 0.0001 0 0.043 0.0001 0.0000 0.0020 
PRE-THREAT PRICE 0.0465 0.0128 0 0.0626 0.0143 0 0.0414 0.0113 0.0000 
PRE-THREAT DELAY 0.0061 0.0082 0.454 0.0074 0.0089 0.406 0.0071 0.0075 0.3420 
 INC_ROUTE_IMPORTANCE -1.4946 0.1641 0 -1.4411 0.1736 0 -1.4969 0.1631 0.0000 
           
CAPABILITY 
PE_RESOURCE 0.098 0.0099 0 0.0822 0.012 0 0.1008 0.0098 0.0000 
PE_SIZE 0.0095 0.0024 0 0.0116 0.0026 0 0.0088 0.0024 0.0000 
FUELPRICE -0.17 0.0276 0 -0.1589 0.03 0 -0.1776 0.0256 0.0000 
           
CONTROLS 
MARKET DISTANCE 0.0173 0.0042 0 0.0162 0.0047 0.001 0.0166 0.0042 0.0000 
DISTANCESQ -0.0007 0.0002 0 -0.0007 0.0002 0 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0000 
MMC 0.8508 0.1065 0 0.817 0.1255 0 0.8387 0.1126 0.0000 
INCUMBENT_NUM 0.274 0.0369 0 0.3226 0.0353 0 0.2557 0.0357 0.0000 
LEISURE 0.1249 0.016 0 0.1342 0.017 0 0.1142 0.0146 0.0000 
HUB 0.001 0.0178 0.955 0.0028 0.0207 0.894 0.0015 0.0180 0.9340 
LOAD_FACTOR -0.1493 0.0328 0 -0.1479 0.0336 0 -0.1281 0.0305 0.0000 
 
          
INTERACTION INC_RESOURCE*MMC 0.2153 0.0624 0.001 0.1994 0.0692 0.004 0.2159 0.0581 0.0000 
 
 




















*p < .10,  **p < .05,  ***p < .01 
  
  ALL MISSING = REAL ALL MISSING = BLUFF 
  Model 5 (4245 Obs) Model 6 (4245 Obs) 
 Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
              
MOTIVATION 
Inc Resource -0.030*** 0.008 0.000 -0.026*** 0.006 0.000 
Market Growth 0.345*** 0.094 0.000 0.447*** 0.074 0.000 
Market Demand 0.000 0.000 0.102 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
Pre-threat Price 0.095*** 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.010 0.119 
Pre-threat Delay 0.007 0.008 0.407 0.012 0.007 0.070 
 INC Route Importance -1.373*** 0.165 0.000 -1.331*** 0.145 0.000 
              
CAPABILITY 
PE Resource 0.057*** 0.009 0.000 0.086*** 0.009 0.000 
PE Size -0.001 0.004 0.859 -0.001 0.003 0.672 
FuelPrice -0.169*** 0.029 0.000 -0.172*** 0.023 0.000 
              
CONTROLS 
Market Distance 0.013*** 0.004 0.002 0.021*** 0.003 0.000 
DistanceSQ -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
MMC 0.454*** 0.108 0.000 0.674*** 0.100 0.000 
Incumbent num 0.378*** 0.032 0.000 0.196*** 0.032 0.000 
Leisure 0.114*** 0.016 0.000 0.103*** 0.013 0.000 
Hub 0.009 0.018 0.599 -0.014 0.016 0.373 
Load factor -0.183*** 0.031 0.000 -0.108*** 0.027 0.000 
              









TABLE A1.5: Robustness Check-Distribution Assumption (Cont’d) 
   70% ARE BLUFF  50% ARE BLUFF  30% ARE BLUFF 




















Market Growth 0.417 0.039 0.295 0.536  0.395 0.042 0.267 0.525  0.417 0.038 0.308 0.526 
Market Demand 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pre-threat Price 0.039 0.005 0.022 0.055  0.055 0.006 0.030 0.073  0.039 0.005 0.024 0.056 
Pre-threat Delay 0.010 0.003 0.000 0.020  0.009 0.003 -
0.001 




















                
CAPABILITY 
































                
CONTROLS 
















MMC 0.606 0.040 0.488 0.731  0.562 0.042 0.399 0.696  0.607 0.040 0.485 0.721 
Incumbent_num 0.250 0.016 0.193 0.299  0.287 0.017 0.235 0.344  0.251 0.016 0.205 0.310 

































               
INTERACTION Inc_Resource*MMC 0.237 0.020 0.167 0.299  0.236 0.023 0.172 0.304  0.237 0.021 0.174 0.302 
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APPENDIX B: FULL LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION IN THE SPLIT-
POPULATION HAZARD MODEL 
 
The split-population hazard model uses a mixture distribution: a logistic regression 
estimates the proportion of new entrants that ‘never’ exit and a hazard regression estimate 
the exit timing of new entrants that do exit a market at some point throughout the 
observation period. This model enables us to investigate simultaneously the effect of 
marketing covariates on the exit likelihood irrespective of time (incidence or ‘logit part’ of 
the model), and the effect of marketing covariates on the time-to-exit for those challengers 
that do exit the market (latency or ‘hazard part’ of the model).  
Let t be a random variable denoting time-to-exit or survival time, with a cumulative 
probability distribution F(t), hazard rate h(t), and survival function S(t) = 1 - F(t). Let Y = 
1 denote an incidence, and Y = 0 no incidence, of the event of interest, δ = 1 indicates an 
exit was observed in the data (non-censored observation) and δ = 0 indicate no exit was 
observed (censored observation). Hence, there are three types of challengers (note that δ = 
1 and Y = 0 simultaneously is impossible): (i) those that may and do leave the market 
during our observation period (δ = 1, Y = 1); (ii) those that are likely to leave the market, 
but outside our observation period (δ = 0, Y = 1); and (iii) those that are unlikely to leave 
the market, even in the future (δ = 0, Y = 0). Essentially, split-population models use the 
functional form of the hazard function to help distinguish 
 
103 
   
between the last two types of observations: using data on the probability of exit and 
time-to-exit for low-cost carriers that do exit the market at some point throughout the 
observation period, the model imputes the probability of exit and time-to-exit for carriers 
for which no exit is observed. The survival function maps the probability that the survival 
time is greater than or equal to t, and is given by: 
S(t | X(t), Z) = [π(Z)S(t | Y = 1, Z, X(t))] + [1 - π(Z)]             (1) 
where Z and X(t) denote the vector of covariates that affect exit likelihood irrespective of 
time and the vector of covariates that affect time-to-exit, respectively. Y = 1 denotes an 
incidence of the event of interest (i.e., an exit), π(Z) is the probability of exit irrespective 
of time, and S(t|Y=1, Z, X(t)) is the survival function (conditional on exit). If all firms exit 
the market (all observations are ‘non-cured’), the model reduces to the standard survival 
model, i.e. π = 1 (and 1-π = 0). Notice that Y = 1 occurs with probability π, and thus Y = 0 
(a challenger that will not exit the market, i.e., a ‘long-term survivor’ in medical jargon) 
occurs with probability 1- π. The likelihood for observation i (a market or route with a new 
low-cost entrant or challenger) in quarter j is thus: 
Li,j(b,β,βT) = [π(zi)h(tj | Y = 1, zi, xi(tj))S(tj | Y = 1, zi, xi(tj))]




δ(i,j))  × [π(zi)S(tj | Y = 1, zi, xi(tj))]
y
i
(1 - δ(i,j))      (2) 
where δi,j denotes the quarter-specific censoring indicator for observation i.
32 By 
rearranging terms (note that the survival function S(.) is common to the first and last 
components) and applying logs, the full log-likelihood function is given by (to facilitate 
                                                 
32 When Y = 1 and 𝛿 = 1, the exponents of the last two components become zero and the likelihood is 
reduced to the first component only; when Y = 1 and 𝛿 = 0, the exponents of the first two components 
become zero and the likelihood is reduced to the last component only; when Y = 0 and 𝛿 = 0 the exponents 
of the first and last components become zero and the likelihood is reduced to the second component only. 
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the reading we omit the conditional Y=1) the sum of the incidence and latency log-
likelihoods, i.e. 
llinc(b|z) = log (∏ [1 − π(zi)]
1−yin
i=1 π(zi)
yi) = ∑ (1 − yi)
n
i=1 log[1 − π(zi)] +
yilog (π(zi)), 
and  












i=1 ,       (3) 
respectively.33  
Split Population Hazard Model (Logit part specification) 
We specify the logit part of the model as a function of pre-entry average market conditions 
because they reflect the type and level of required resources that determine market survival 
in general, i.e., irrespective of time (see Helfat and Lieberman 2002). Specifically, π(zi) on 
route i is a function of incumbents’ pre-entry prices (IncPrePricei), service convenience, 
measured by flight frequency during both non-peak (IncPreFreqi) and peak-time 
(IncPrePeakFreqi), and service quality, measured by both on-time performance 
(IncPreOTPi) and plane size (IncPrePlaneSizei), and is specified as follows (see e.g., Wei 
and Hansen 2005):  
log(π(zi)/ 1 - π(zi)) = γ0 + γ1IncPrePricei + γ2IncPreFreqi + γ3IncPrePeakFreqi + 
γ4IncPreOTPi + γ5IncPrePlaneSizei + γ6ChllgPriceij      
(4) 
                                                 
33 It is impossible to know, from observed data, whether a low-cost carrier will never exit a given route or is 
just right-censored. In the unlikely case that all carriers would exit, the split-population model would 
incorrectly identify some of them as being cured, i.e., never exit (see Jaggia 2011). This is more likely in 
short datasets. Because our dataset leaves plenty of time for those carriers that entered routes long time ago 
to exit them, We believe that a split-population model is more realistic than a hazard model that assumes 
the data are right-censored. 
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where IncPrePricei, IncPreFreqi, IncPrePeakFreqi, IncPreOTPi, and IncPrePlaneSizei are, 
respectively, incumbents’ pre-entry prices, service convenience measured by both non-
peak and peak-time flight frequency, and service quality measured by both on-time 
performance (OTP) and plane size (Wei and Hansen 2005). All measurements are averages 
over eight pre-entry quarters. We also control for the challenger’s price ChllgPriceij. Note 
that omitted variables in the probability of exit (logit part) are assumed to be independent 
of omitted variables in the time-to-exit. While this may not be a particularly realistic 
assumption (unobserved characteristics that make challengers less likely to exit are 
probably the ones that make challengers less likely to exit sooner), it is less problematic 
than the stronger assumptions of both models (see Goldhaber, Krieg, and Theobald 2014 
for a similar argument). A hazard model would assume there is no error in the probability 
of exit (every challenger is assumed to exit) and a logit model would assume there is no 









   
APPENDIX C: 2SRI METHOD 
A two-stage residual inclusion estimation method (2SRI) is an extension of the popular 
two-stage least squares (2SLS). The 2SLS is not consistent for nonlinear models, whereas 
the 2SRI estimator is (Terza, Basu, and Rathouz 2008). The first stage equation regresses 
the incumbents’ prices on a set of exogenous variables and an instrumental variable (IV), 
which must be correlated with prices but not with the new entrant’s time-to-exit. In the 
second stage of 2SRI prices are not replaced: the first-stage residuals are instead included 
as an additional variable. Following the footsteps of previous studies of price elasticity that 
controlled for price endogeneity in the airline industry (Lurkin et al. 2017; Mumbower, 
Garrow, and Higgins 2014), we use the number of connecting passengers (ConnPass) as 
an IV. 
In the airline industry, one-stop routes, say A-B-C or B-C-D, and non-stop routes, say B-
C, are two distinct types of markets facing a different demand: while one-stop routes serve 
connecting passengers (those flying from A to B and then from B to C or from B to C and 
then from C to D), non-stop routes do not. Typically, major incumbent carriers serve one-
stop routes and therefore carry not only direct passengers but also connecting passengers. 
Low-cost carriers, in turn, serve non-stop routes with virtually no connecting 
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passengers.34 A large number of connecting passengers, i.e., a high demand in A-B-C or 
B-C-D routes, will significantly increase the demand for incumbents’ B-C route and thus 
reduce the incumbents’ cost for each available seat mile in that route and thereby its fares 
(Shaw 2007)35. On the contrary, and by definition, a large number of connecting passengers 
should not affect a challenger’s non-stop B-C route. In other words, the number of 
connecting passengers, ConnPass, is likely to be correlated with incumbents’ prices (in 
one-stop routes) but not with the challenger’s market-share and profitability (in non-stop 
routes), nor the challenger’s exit likelihood or time-to-exit.  
We find that ConnPass satisfies the exclusion restriction and relevance criteria 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005), i.e. (a) it is not directly correlated with the challenger’s 
hazard rate and (b) it is sufficiently correlated with our price variable. Dixit and 
Chintagunta (2007) also suggest that a good instrument for the incumbents’ prices in the 
context of airlines market exit is time-varying and airline-market specific, and ConnPass 
meets these two criteria. Moreover, we test if the ConnPass instrument is strong enough 
by regressing incumbents’ prices on ConnPass. Following Ebbes et al. (2016) we estimate 
two first-stage models. The first one includes ConnPass and all other independent variables 
in the main regression equation, and the second one includes only exogeneous variables 
and excludes ConnPass. We find that the incremental F-statistic between these two models 
is significantly greater than 10 (ΔF = 25), which indicates that the instrument is a strong 
one (Ebbes et al. 2016).  
                                                 
34 The only exception is AirTran airlines that used a hub-and-spoke business model, and so we dropped 
AirTran even at the expense of losing roughly 20% of the observations. We also estimated the IV model 
using all observations and the conclusions regarding the endogeneity concerns remain valid.  
35 notice that more than 65% of an airline’s costs, e.g., fuel costs, crew salaries, airport landing fees, aircraft 
leasing fees, are independent of the number of passengers on a plane. 
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Having a proper instrument, we first test the null hypothesis that price can be treated as an 
exogenous regressor using the t-statistic associated with the residual included in the second 
stage. Following Lurkin et al. (2017), the insignificant t-statistic indicates that price should 
be considered as an exogenous variable and endogeneity is not a real concern. In our case, 





















   
APPENDIX D: VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS 
MMC Calculation: 
as follows. For challenger c, in route i, we count all common routes with incumbents over 
all routes in quarter j and then divide the challenger’s total contact by (n - 1), where n is 
the number of incumbents (including the challenger) in route i. Finally, we standardized 
the average count by the number of markets served by the challenger in quarter j 
Route Importance: 
We employ the measure developed by Dunn (2008): for each route, the network importance 
measure is determined by the number of non-stop markets that originate from the two 
endpoints (excluding the non-stop route to the city being considered) divided by its network 
size. For instance, if, in a route between city “O” and city “D”, an LCC has five non-stop 
routes out of “O” and six non-stop routes out of “D”, and it serves 100 routes within its 
network, then the network centrality (importance) of route O-D is [(5+6)-2] / 100 = .09.  
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APPENDIX E: TYPES OF MISSINGNESS 
Missing at random vs. missing not at random 
There are three types of missing data depending on the mechanisms that may generate 
them: (1) missing at random (MAR) data refers to the case when the “missingness” in the 
dependent variable (Yi ) does not depend on its value, but may depend on the value of other 
variables. In other words, after controlling for other variables, the probability of the missing 
Yi is not related to the value of Yi; (2) missing completely at random (MCAR) data are a 
special case of (MAR), which means that the probability of missing data on Yi does not 
depend on Yi value or the values of any other variable in the data set; (3) if the MAR 
assumption is violated then the missing data are not at random (MNAR) and the 
missingness mechanism and data are nonignorable. In this latter case, the reason for 
missingness often depends on the missing values themselves. For instance, nonresponse in 
an income survey may be related to an unobserved income. A missing data is ignorable if 
(a) the missingness mechanism is at random (MAR), and (b) the parameters for a missing-
data generation are unrelated to the parameters to be estimated. MAR and “ignorability” 
are often equivalent since assumption b is almost always satisfied.  
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MICE Steps 
The chained equations algorithm cycles through incomplete variables one at a time, 
drawing imputations from a series of univariate conditional distributions. At each 
imputation round, missing values for a particular variable are drawn from a distribution 
that conditions on all other variables, including filled-in variables from a previous step.  
MICE follows the following steps to impute missing values (Azur, et al. 2011): 
Step 1: Initially, a simple imputation is performed for every missing value for each variable 
in the dataset. At this step, usually, missing values will be replaced by the mean of the 
observed values. These imputed values can be thought of as a “place holder” 
Step 2: The “place holder” – imputed values -- for one variable “X” are set back to missing. 
Step 3: The observed values from the variable “X” in Step 2 are regressed on the other 
variables in the imputation model, which may or may not consist of all of the variables in 
the dataset. In other words, “X” becomes the dependent variable in a regression model and 
all the other variables are independent variables in the regression model. These regression 
models operate under the same assumptions that one would make when performing linear, 
logistic, or Poison regression models outside of the context of imputing missing data. 
Step 4: The missing values for “X” are then replaced with predictions (imputations) from 
the regression model. When “X” is subsequently used as an independent variable in the 
regression models for other variables, both the observed and these imputed values will be 
used. 
Step 5: For variables that have missing observations, repeat steps 2–4 for a number of 
rounds to create several complete datasets. At the end of each round, all of the missing 
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values will be replaced with predictions from regressions that reflect the relationships 
observed in the data. 
 
 
 
